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Abstract
When an individual performs several tasks simultaneously, processing resources must be
allocated to different brain systems to produce energy for neurons to fire. Following the
evidence from neuroscience, we model the brain as an organization in which a coordinator
allocates limited resources to the brain systems responsible for the different tasks. Systems
are privately informed about the amount of resources necessary to perform their task and
compete to obtain the resources. The coordinator arbitrates the demands while satisfying
the resource constraint. We show that the optimal mechanism is to impose to each system
with privately known needs a cap in resources that depends negatively on the amount of
resources requested by the other system. This allocation can be implemented using a bi-
ologically plausible mechanism. Finally, we provide some implications of our theory: (i)
performance is inversely related to the difficulty of the task and can be flawless for suffi-
ciently simple tasks, (ii) the dynamic allocation rule exhibits inertia (current allocations
are increasing in past needs), and (iii) different cognitive tasks are performed by different
systems only if the tasks are sufficiently important.
Keywords: mechanism design, revelation principle, neuroeconomic theory, resource allo-
cation, multiple brain systems, task inertia, neural Darwinism.
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1 Introduction
Our ability to handle multiple tasks simultaneously depends on the coordination of various
brain mechanisms. Research in the brain sciences has established that individual decision
making requires the allocation of scarce processing resources to the brain systems involved
in understanding tasks, planning responses, and implementing actions. The objective of
this paper is to study the relationship between the mechanisms for allocating resources in
the brain and the quality of the resulting decisions.
To this purpose, we develop a parsimonious theory of constrained optimal behavior
based on resource allocation under neurophysiological limitations. This approach affords a
new perspective on decision-making which is different from traditional bounded rationality
models, as it provides foundations for “mistakes” and “biases” in decision-making that do
not rely on the ad-hoc imposition of imperfections. The fundamental features of brain
processes that will constitute the building blocks of our theory are briefly introduced here
(the supporting evidence is reviewed more thoroughly in section 2.1).1 First, there is
brain specialization. Different brain systems are recruited to perform different tasks and
neurons in a given system respond exclusively to features of that particular task. These
neurons remain active as long as they receive resources and the task is not completed.
The behavior of neurons in a system is therefore consistent with the maximization of task
performance.2 Second, there is “communication” of needs. The consumption of resources
in a brain system triggers a signal which results in more resources being allocated to that
system. Third, the resource allocation process is centralized. Some areas of the lateral
prefrontal cortex (LPFC) play an active role when attention is divided, for instance when
two tasks have to be completed at the same time. This points to the existence of what has
been called a ‘Central Executive System’ (CES) whose role is to coordinate the systems
involved in the different tasks. Fourth, resources are scarce. The brain has a limited
capacity to deal with concurrent tasks and, as a result, it must allocate scarce resources
efficiently.
In the paper, we build an agency model based on these four fundamental brain architec-
ture principles. In our model, CES (the ‘principal’) is responsible for allocating resources
to systems with privately known needs (the ‘agents’) given a resource constraint. More
precisely, we consider the case of an individual who must perform three tasks (0, 1, 2) at
1Notice that the paper takes the brain architecture as given. It does not address important questions
related to its evolutionary rationale (see Robson (2001) and Robson and Samuelson (2009) for formal
models of the biological basis of economic behavior).
2Although this is sometimes surprising for economists, there are strong physiological and evolutionary
arguments supporting the idea that brain systems compete for resources (see section 7 for a brief review
and discussion).
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the same time, each carried out by a different system (0, 1, 2). The amount of resources
necessary to perform a task is a function of its complexity, and performance decreases
with the difference between resources needed and resources obtained. Total resources are
available in a fixed amount. CES seeks to maximize the sum of performances in the three
tasks. It knows the complexity of task 0 and extracts information from systems 1 and 2
about the complexity of tasks 1 and 2 v´ıa a communication mechanism.
We first conduct a normative analysis where we assume that CES can resort to any
communication mechanism. This allows us to restrict attention to direct revelation mech-
anisms that are incentive compatible in dominant strategies. We characterize the optimal
mechanism and show that the allocation is such that each system is guaranteed a mini-
mum level of resources. A system can obtain resources above that minimum if and only if
at least one of the other systems chooses not to exhaust its guaranteed level of resources
(Proposition 1). We then perform some comparative statics and find that a resource
monotonicity principle holds generally: (i) if one system becomes less important from
the viewpoint of CES then it receives fewer resources whereas all other systems receive
(weakly) more resources, and (ii) if the total amount of resources available increases then
all systems (weakly) benefit (Proposition 2).
The normative analysis is important in that it sets an upper bound on the attainable
performance. We then show that the optimal mechanism can be implemented using a
simple and neurophysiologically plausible process: systems receive resources at different
rates, they choose whether to deplete them and, if they do, CES decides whether to provide
more resources (Proposition 3). This finding is critical. Indeed, when we observe a simple
allocation rule, one is tempted to conclude that it is because individuals are subject to
ad-hoc limitations. Instead, our results shows that, for our problem, nothing would be
gained by resorting to more complicated mechanisms: the constrained optimal choice can
be implemented with a simple ‘grab until satiated’ procedure.
Next, we derive behavioral implications of our mechanism and confront them with the
experimental results obtained in neuroscience studies. Most notably, our theory predicts
that performance will be flawless if and only if tasks are sufficiently simple (Corollary 1). It
also predicts performance improvements over time and task-inertia: if needs at every date
are independently drawn from the same (unknown) distribution, the allocation of resources
at a certain date will depend positively on the needs experienced in the past (Proposition
4 and Corollaries 2 and 3). These results match the experimental neuroscience evidence
and arise in our framework only when needs are private information. Also, we show that
in the biologically plausible implementation mechanism, the time required to complete
an easy task is shorter the more difficult that same task was in the past (Corollary 4).
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Last, we propose a novel testable implication regarding the architecture of the brain:
from an informational viewpoint it is efficient to concentrate cognitive tasks in one system
whenever the importance of the tasks is relatively low and to separate them into different
systems otherwise (Proposition 5 and Corollary 5).
Finally, we believe our results can explain recent behavioral findings on self-control.
According to Vohs et al. (2008) and Pocheptsova et al. (2009), the exercise of self-control
impacts the performance in unrelated but effortful deliberative activities and vice versa.
These findings are attributed to the depletion of glucose by both tasks, resulting in a
shortage of resources to complete both of them efficiently (see e.g. Gaillot et al., 2007;
Masicampo and Baumeister, 2008). This echoes our theory and exemplifies the mechanism
we outline. Glucose, the critical metabolic resource, is present in the bloodstream in
limited quantities. When the individual must both exercise self-control and complete an
unrelated deliberative activity, both tasks compete for the scarce resource resulting in
decreased performance.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we present two literature reviews:
the neuroscience evidence supporting our theory and the related research in economics. In
section 3, we describe the formal model and solve for the benchmark case with full infor-
mation. In section 4, we characterize the allocation rule under asymmetric information,
perform some comparative statics, and discuss a biologically plausible implementation
procedure. In sections 5 and 6, we discuss two behavioral implications of our theory: task
inertia in dynamic allocation problems and the incentives for specialization vs. integration
of tasks within systems. In section 7, we provide some concluding comments. Proofs of
the propositions and corollaries can be found in Appendix A2.
2 Literature in neuroscience and economics
2.1 Evidence from neuroscience
This section reviews in detail the neuroscience evidence underlying our theory.3 We will
refer to it when we introduce the formal elements of our model. We are interested in the
brain mechanisms governing decision-making when an individual is presented with two
tasks to be performed concurrently.
Tasks and systems. When a decision-maker is facing a task, populations of neurons
specialized in different features relevant for that task are recruited. These constitute a
3It can be skipped by readers who either have a background in neuroscience or are not interested in
the details of the brain architecture. Readers interested in a yet more detailed introduction to these
physiological processes are referred to Brocas (2012).
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system. To understand the ‘objective’ of a system, it is useful to look at its components:
the neurons. Neurons fire in response to certain inputs. For instance, the spiking activity
of a neuron in the visual system represents a small part of the visual environment, as
the neuron is sensitive to the presence of a few specific features only.4 As such, neurons
are only concerned about transmitting information regarding the features they are tuned
to detect. Given such a construct, a system only transmits information detected by its
components, that is, information relevant for that task. Neurons keep firing as long as
they detect relevant information. A system can therefore be represented as an entity that
cares exclusively about transmitting information to perform its own task.5
Processing resources. A task is performed through a communication process between
neurons used to detect features of the environment (in the sensory system), make choices
and send orders to act accordingly (in the motor system). Neurons use electrical impulses
and chemical signals to transmit information which requires energy delivered by the oxida-
tion of glucose extracted from arterial blood. This energy is used for propagating signals
and returning the membrane to its resting potential after firing (Attwell and Laughlin,
2001). Firing therefore relies on metabolic resources (oxygen and glucose) carried by
the bloodstream. Enhanced firing in a system indicates the system is active. Given the
relationship between firing and metabolic resources, the latter are commonly used as a
proxy for neural activity6 in a series of methods that record differentials in consumption
of metabolic resources (Fox et al., 1988; Hyder et al., 2002) or differentials in blood flow.7
This body of evidence suggests that task performance is related to the consumption of
metabolic resources8 which are, in principle, available in the bloodstream to be grabbed by
neurons.9 However, the availability of metabolic resources is only a necessary condition for
4However, neurons respond not only to the presence or absence of features but also to their values by
producing graded responses. They do so by controlling the number of spikes they fire.
5A system is related to a task. That is, neurons active in one task are part of the system performing
that task, but they can also be active in a different task involving a different system. In other words, two
systems do not need to be two physically different areas of the brain.
6The literature studying cerebral blood flow has established the existence of a functional coupling
between neural activity and brain metabolism. Cerebral activation processes are accompanied by a dynamic
adjustment of cerebral blood flow. Blood flow is correlated with oxygen delivery to the brain. The increase
in blood flow following the presentation of a task is positively related to the performance in that task
(Duschek and Schandry (2004, 2006)).
7In particular, PET monitors detect changes in blood flow, glucose usage or oxygen consumption. fMRI
signals reflect the degree of blood oxygenation and flow, and measure the blood-oxygen-level dependent
(BOLD) response.
8The joint observation that one system receives more oxygen when a certain task is performed and that
subjects with a lesion in that system are unable to perform the task provides yet another indirect support
for the idea that the system utilizes resources to perform the task.
9Some medical conditions are characterized by the inability to regulate the amount of resources in the
brain. For instance, too much or too little glucose in insulin-dependent diabetes patients have detrimental
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task performance. The metabolic cost of brain activity is high, which may be the limiting
factor for both the number of neurons that can be active at any given point in time as well
as the maximum frequency of firing of individual neurons (Lennie, 2003; Attwell and Gibb,
2005). This evidence suggests that the metabolic resources that can be used at any given
point in time are limited. Recent studies have also shown that enhanced firing is correlated
with increased attention to a stimulus, and several processes involving working memory
have been found to be fundamental to attention (see Knudsen (2007) for a review). Those
mechanisms are believed to modulate the signals sent along communication channels. In
particular only some signals gain access to working memory (competitive selection, see
Desimone and Duncan (1995)) and the strengths of the competing signals is regulated
(top down sensitivity control, see Egeth and Yantis (1997)). This literature indicates that
firing rates in a system result from a controlled usage of metabolic resources. Synaptic
plasticity is thought to be the mechanism through which such regulation occurs. We will
refer to the resources that can be used to transmit information efficiently as processing
resources, but the reader may keep in mind their relationship to other terminologies such
as attentional resources or computational resources. Processing resources are scarce and
their allocation is constrained.
Asymmetric information. Typically, neurons in a system detect information contained
in a stimulus before neurons in other systems, creating a time lag during which only part
of the brain possesses relevant information about the stimulus. This information becomes
available to other interested brain areas if and when it is transmitted. Information is not
transmitted uniformly along all existing pathways but rather selectively, so that not all
systems are aware of the information. Besides, some brain areas are either unconnected
or unidirectionally connected to the other areas. This feature of the brain anatomy is
the result of evolution, which optimizes the number and location of the highly scarce
and energetically demanding neural connections. Delayed transmission and limited neural
connectivity immediately implies a restricted flow of information or, in the economics
language, asymmetric information.
Centralization of the resource allocation process. A number of fMRI studies have found
that certain regions of the LPFC exhibit enhanced activation when two tasks are performed
simultaneously. These regions do not exhibit such enhanced activation (i) when only one
task is presented to the subject, (ii) when both tasks are presented but the subject is
instructed to selectively focus on only one of them, or (iii) when both tasks are presented
and performed sequentially (D’Esposito et al., 1995; Herath et al., 2001; Szameitat et
al., 2002; Jiang, 2004). The same phenomenon is observed for branching, that is, when
effects on cognitive functions (Cox et al., 2005).
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subjects must keep in mind a main goal while performing concurrent subgoals (Koechlin
et al., 1999). In parallel, the literature on task switching has found that several regions
of the PFC are activated when a switch occurs (Monsell, 2003). Similar findings have
been obtained with other techniques. In particular patients with brain lesions in the left
DLPFC have problems switching between the attributes they are instructed to attend to
(Rogers et al., 1998; Keele and Rafal, 2000) and subjects in a TMS study whose DLPFC
has been disrupted exhibit an impaired ability to divide attention between tasks (Johnson
et al., 2007). These results point to the plausible hypothesis of the existence of a Central
Executive System (CES) whose role is to “coordinate the concurrent processing of the
different streams of information” (Szameitat et al. (2002, p. 1184)). The CES is a construct
that has long been invoked in theoretical models of human cognition, in particular to
represent the allocation of attentional resources within working memory (Baddeley and
Hitch, 1974; Norman and Shallice, 1986). Even though the evidence reported before is
consistent with this construct, both the neuroanatomy and the specific role of the CES
are still under study. Some findings suggest a distributed CES neuroanatomy (including
regions of the LPFC) rather than a specific and unique region (Baddeley, 1998; Garavan
et al., 2000). Said differently, CES is not a physical organ and LPFC may not be the
only region showing differentiated activation in dual-tasks experiments. Moreover, the
function of the regions involved specifically in dual tasks experiments cannot be inferred
with certainty from activation patterns. However, LPFC is recurrently implicated in top-
down control (Miller and Cohen (2001)), working memory (Romo et al., 1999; Romo and
Salinas, 2003) and attention processes (Pessoa et al., 2003; Lau et al., 2004). Therefore,
its involvement in resource management seems a reasonable hypothesis.
Behavioral interferences and neural activity patterns. Single- vs. dual-task experiments
have established some interesting results on neural activation and behavioral patterns.
Studies have shown that the volume of activation is smaller in the dual-task condition
than in the sum of the two related single-task conditions (Just et al., 2001; Loose et al.,
2003; Johnson and Zatorre, 2006; Newman et al., 2007).10 Sub-additivity suggests the
existence of “biological mechanisms that place an upper bound on the amount of cortical
tissue that can be activated at any given time” (Just et al., 2001, p. 424)).11 Some other
studies highlight a significant behavioral interference when subjects perform the dual-
10These studies measure activity in the sensory and association areas that are active in one (and only one)
of the tasks. They are designed to minimize overlapping areas by choosing tasks that are known to recruit
different brain systems (e.g., mental rotation of visually depicted objects and auditory comprehension).
11A puzzling result in Just et al. (2001) is that, contrary to the other papers reviewed above, LPFC
activation does not change between the single- and dual-task treatments. A possible explanation is that
subjects are requested to perform high-level cognitive tasks so that the single-task treatment may already
be producing significant activation in the LPFC. This suggests evidence should be interpreted cautiously.
6
task. In particular, reaction times (Jiang, 2004) and error rates (Szameitat et al., 2002)
increase, suggesting that the two tasks compete for attention. Behaviorally, performance
in the dual-task is lower than in the sum of the two single tasks (Just et al., 2001), which is
consistent with the above mentioned activation patterns, and with the scarcity hypothesis
of processing resources.
Combining the evidence just reviewed, we will build a theory in line with the CES
hypothesis and endow it with the ability to allocate scarce processing resources. We will
then derive some behavioral implications. Yet, our theory is abstract; the reader shall keep
in mind that the role of CES could be performed by a different brain system or process.
As such, any controversy arising over the specific role of CES should not apply to our
theoretical argument.
2.2 Related literature in economics
From a theoretical viewpoint, the problem is related to three strands of the economics
literature. First, it is related to the research on mechanism design without transfers
(see e.g., Holmstro¨m, 1977; Melumad and Shibano, 1991; Alonso and Matouschek, 2007,
2008; Martimort and Semenov, 2008; Carrasco and Fuchs, 2009; Koessler and Martimort,
2012). While the absence of transfers typically requires justification in the literature on
organizations, in our setting the neurobiology evidence suggests the lack of other means
of ‘compensation’. With respect to this literature, our paper combines aspects of mul-
tiple agents and multiple actions in a novel setting with capacity constraints. Second,
it also bears some commonalities with the axiomatic social choice literature that studies
rationing problems (see e.g., Sprumont, 1991; Barbera, Jackson and Neme, 1997; Moulin,
2000). This literature has provided characterizations of rationing mechanisms that satisfy
efficiency, strategy-proofness and some additional properties. We depart from it in two re-
spects: we consider (weakly) monotone preferences rather than single-peaked preferences
and we focus on mechanisms that maximize the expected performance of systems. As we
will show, however, the optimal mechanism does satisfy their main properties. Finally, it
is also related to the team theory literature that studies the decomposition and decentral-
ization of resource allocations when systems with a common goal are unable to fully share
all available information (as in e.g., Geanakoplos and Milgrom, 1991; see also Garicano
and Van Zandt (2013) for a recent survey). Interestingly, the optimal mechanism that
we derive also affords a decentralized implementation. In our setup, however, allocative
imperfections in the decision rules result from the systems’ self-interest rather than from
exogenous constraints on communication.
From a conceptual viewpoint, the paper is related to the behavioral economics liter-
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ature that studies decision-making when individuals have imperfect self-knowledge (see
e.g, Carrillo and Mariotti, 2000; Be´nabou and Tirole, 2004, 2011; Bodner and Prelec,
2003; Brocas and Carrillo, 2005, 2008; Dal Bo and Tervio¨, 2007; Ali, 2011). Our model
focuses on a novel set of issues, namely performance in a multi-tasking environment. It
also departs significantly in the methodological approach: rather than building a model
of boundedly rational behavior based on introspection, empirical or experimental data,
we take the neuroscience findings about the brain architecture as inputs for modeling the
constraints in the optimization problem.12
3 The model
3.1 Systems and objectives
Based on the evidence described in section 2.1, we build the following resource allocation
model. First, there is a set of systems. Each system is responsible for a task. Systems
are composed of neurons, which demand resources. Resource deficits imply a decrease in
performance. Second, there is a Central Executive System (CES) which is responsible for
the optimal allocation of the scarce resources between systems and whose objective is to
maximize an overall performance function.
Formally, we assume there are three tasks, and system l (∈ L = {0, 1, 2}) is responsible
for task l. As reviewed in section 2.1, system l can be represented as a selfish entity focused
exclusively on the performance in its own task. Let Θl = [0, θl] be the set of possible
resources that task l may require. If θl ∈ Θl is the actual amount of resources necessary to
carry out task l flawlessly and xl are the resources allocated to system l, the system seeks
xl = θl. Without loss of generality, a system can be endowed with a performance function
Πl(xl; θl) that is maximized at xl = θl. There is a loss whenever xl < θl. The effect of too
many resources is less clear. Indeed, the system may in some cases be able to costlessly
discard resources above θl, which formally means that Πl(xl; θl) = Πl(θl; θl) for all xl ≥ θl.
In some other cases, too many resources can have counter effects on performance, which
formally means that Πl(xl; θl) < Πl(x
′
l; θl) for all xl > x
′
l ≥ θl. For example, excessive
attention may be counterproductive. Either way, the performance function is increasing in
xl up to θl and non-increasing above it. For the rest of the paper, we assume the following
functional form:
Πl(xl; θl) =
{
αl ul(xl − θl) if xl ≤ θl
0 if xl > θl
(1)
12In that respect, the paper is closer to Brocas and Carrillo (2008) which studies the dynamic choices of
an individual when brain systems have different mental representations of current vs. distant prospects.
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with ul(0) = 0, u
′
l(0) = 0, u
′
l(z) > 0 and u
′′
l (z) ≤ 0 for all z < 0. Under this formalization,
a more complex task (higher θl) requires more resources.
13 As the difference between needs
and resources granted (θl−xl) increases, performance deteriorates. Resources above needs
do not hinder performance because they can be discarded by the systems at no cost.14
3.2 Optimization under full information
The optimization problem of CES consists in distributing a fixed amount of resources k
among the three systems so as to maximize an overall performance function. We formally
represent it as:
max
{x0,x1,x2}
Π0(x0; θ0) + Π1(x1; θ1) + Π2(x2; θ2)
s.t. x0 + x1 + x2 ≤ k (R)
x0 ≥ 0, x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0 (F)
The objective function is the sum of the systems’ performances, where the parameter αl
in (1) can capture either the weight of task l on the objective function of CES or a reward
system imposed externally to complete each particular task. This objective function is,
admittedly, restrictive (for example, in some settings one could expect complementarities
or substitutabilities among tasks). It seems, however, a reasonable first approximation
especially when the tasks are imposed externally. The resource constraint (R) reflects the
maximum resources k available to perform the three tasks. The feasibility constraint (F)
captures the minimum resources that can be allocated to each system. The analysis can
be trivially extended to a positive minimum amount of resources necessary for a system
to operate. The problem also presupposes that CES does not necessitate resources to
coordinate the needs of systems. This goes largely against the evidence presented in
section 2.1 but it is imposed only for simplicity.15
The problem is trivial when θ0 + θ1 + θ2 ≤ k: each system receives the resources it
needs, (i.e., xl = θl), and the excess resources are discarded. In this case, each system
performs flawlessly and performance is then maximized at zero. The problem becomes
interesting when θ0 + θ1 + θ2 > k, which immediately implies that the resource constraint
is binding. Let xFl be the solution to the problem under full information in this case.
13Note that the comparison over levels of complexity is defined within tasks not between tasks. For
example, spelling an 8-letter word is more complex than spelling a 3-letter word.
14In a previous version (Alonso, Brocas and Carrillo 2011) we showed that similar results are obtained
with a single-peaked quadratic performance function: Πl(xl − θl) = −αl (xl − θl)2 for all xl.
15Indeed, one could trivially extend the model and assume that CES requires k˜ resources for coordinating
activities and that only k − k˜ resources are available for the systems.
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Given u′(0) = 0, the individual underperforms in all tasks (xFl (θ0, θ1, θ2) < θl for all l)
except in the trivial limit case where no resources are needed (θl = 0).
4 Incomplete knowledge of needs
The more realistic and interesting situation arises when CES does not know how many
resources are required by some of the systems. As motivated in section 2.1, information
asymmetry matches the physiological evidence on brain connectivity. It introduces an
endogenous cost of resource allocation and information processing.
In the rest of the paper, we will consider two classes of systems. System 0 is responsible
for a basic motor skill task 0 which corresponds, for example, to lifting an object or looking
in a certain direction. The needs to perform this task, θ0, are known. Systems 1 and 2
are responsible for higher order cognitive tasks. These include vision, hearing, abstract
projection and language, among others. We use subscripts i and j for systems 1 and 2
with i 6= j. The needs of system i, θi, are unknown to CES, and depend crucially on
the type and difficulty of the cognitive task to be performed (face identification, auditory
comprehension, mental representation of shapes, word recognition, etc.). CES only knows
that θ1 and θ2 are independently drawn from continuous distributions with c.d.f. F
1(θ1)
and F 2(θ2) and densities f
1(θ1) and f
2(θ2).
16 Let hi(θi) =
f i(θi)
1−F i(θi) be the hazard rate
of θi. We assume that the distribution of needs of system i has an increasing hazard rate
(IHR) which, as is well known, rules out thick tails in the distribution. This condition is
imposed to ensure certain regularity properties of the solution.
Assumption 1 (IHR) hi(θ
′
i) ≥ hi(θi) for all θ′i ≥ θi.
Our objective is to determine the resource allocation mechanism which is optimal from
the viewpoint of CES given its imperfect knowledge of needs. As in the previous section,
we maintain the assumption that the resource constraint is always binding which, given
that θ1 and θ2 are unknown, can now be stated as follows.
Assumption 2 (shortage) θ0 ≥ k.
The first step of our analysis consists in adopting a normative approach and determin-
ing the optimal allocation when CES can use any conceivable communication mechanism:
each system sends a message requesting resources and CES responds with an allocation
as a function of the messages received. Applying the revelation principle, we can without
16The results can be trivially extended to more than one system (hence, more than one task) with known
needs. By contrast, extensions to three or more systems with unknown needs would be more involved.
10
loss of generality restrict attention to direct revelation mechanisms where each system i
‘announces’ its needs θ˜i ∈ Θi. Based on the announcements, CES ‘commits’ to a resource
allocation rule D:
D(θ˜1, θ˜2) =
(
x0(θ˜1, θ˜2), x1(θ˜1, θ˜2), x2(θ˜1, θ˜2)
)
for (θ˜1, θ˜2) ∈ Θ1 ×Θ2.
We restrict attention to mechanisms that can be implemented in dominant strategies.
From a neuroeconomic viewpoint, implementation in dominant strategies seems most nat-
ural as it ensures that a system does not have to ‘form beliefs’ about the objectives, needs,
demands or even the ‘existence’ of other systems.17 We also assume that when a system
is indifferent between several allocations, it chooses the one that is optimal for CES. This
rules out uninteresting equilibria such as, for example, one where system i always reports
the highest needs and therefore, in equilibrium, the allocation is insensitive to system i’s
true needs.
The allocation rule is constructed in a way that, for system i, announcing θ˜i = θi is
incentive compatible in dominant strategies. Formally:
Πi(xi(θi, θj); θi) ≥ Πi(xi(θ˜i, θj); θi) ∀ i, θi, θ˜i, θj . (DSIC)
Notice that the assumptions imposed on the behavior of systems are minimal. Their
sole concern is to obtain the resources necessary to complete their tasks. Each system
realizes that resources are scarce (simply by noticing that needs are not always fulfilled)
and that their availability may depend on external factors. However, awareness of the
needs or even the existence of other systems and other tasks is not required.
The normative analysis immediately raises a question: Is it realistic to think in these
terms? The answer is yes and no. On the one hand, our entire research rests on the
fact that the brain has some well-documented physiological limitations in the availability,
transmission and processing of information. Putting no restrictions on the type of commu-
nication allowed contradicts that view. On the other hand, we show in Appendix A1 that
a reasonable two-stage mechanism where CES allocates some initial resources, systems
choose whether to consume them and, as a function of their choice, CES decides whether
to grant more resources is formally equivalent to a static incentive compatible mechanism
where systems (truthfully) report their needs. In any case, a crucial advantage of the nor-
mative analysis is that it provides an upper bound on the attainable performance of CES.
A main contribution of the paper will rest on the subsequent positive approach, where
17From a theory viewpoint it would be interesting to determine the optimal mechanism in Bayesian
strategies, as Carrasco and Fuchs (2009) do in a somewhat related theoretical setting. However, we would
have a hard time interpreting this type of mechanisms in our context.
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we investigate if the optimal allocation described in the normative analysis can indeed be
implemented using a simple and physiologically plausible mechanism.
4.1 The optimization problem
Given the imperfect knowledge of needs, we will assume that CES maximizes the expected
performance of the tasks. Among all the possible direct mechanisms, let M be the class
that admits the following representation: a mechanism D ∈ M if and only if there exist
functions x¯1(θ2) and x¯2(θ1) such that
D(θ1, θ2) =

x1(θ1, θ2) = min {θ1, x¯1(θ2)} ,
x2(θ1, θ2) = min {θ2, x¯2(θ1)} ,
x0(θ1, θ2) = k − x1(θ1, θ2)− x2(θ1, θ2).
(2)
In other words, M is the class of direct mechanisms that simply impose an upper
bound on the resources granted to each system, where this upper bound depends on the
reports of other systems. Importantly, any D ∈ M is also dominant strategy incentive
compatible. The following lemma allows us to narrow down the class of direct mechanisms
that we must consider when studying the problem faced by CES.
Lemma 1 Any feasible and dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism that max-
imizes the expected performance of tasks must belong to M, that is, takes the form (2).
With this lemma, the problem under asymmetric information reduces to:
max
D∈M
∫ ∫ [
Π0(x0(θ1, θ2); θ0) + Π1(x1(θ1, θ2); θ1) + Π2(x2(θ1, θ2); θ2)
]
dF 1(θ1) dF
2(θ2)
s.t. x0(θ1, θ2) + x1(θ1, θ2) + x2(θ1, θ2) ≤ k ∀ θ1, θ2 (R)
x0(θ1, θ2) ≥ 0, x1(θ1, θ2) ≥ 0, x2(θ1, θ2) ≥ 0 ∀ θ1, θ2 (F)
where the dominant strategy incentive compatibility constraint (DSIC) is automatically
satisfied by the mechanism D and therefore ignored, and (R) and (F) are the resource and
feasibility constraints introduced previously. Given Assumption 2, (R) always binds at the
optimum, that is, resources are always exhausted. Using (R) to express x0 as a function
of x1 and x2, inserting this expression in Π0(·) and using (1) and (2), we can rewrite the
problem as:
P : max
D∈M
∫ ∫ [
α1 u1
(
x1(θ1, θ2)− θ1
)
+ α2 u2
(
x2(θ1, θ2)− θ2
)
+α0 u0
(
k − x1(θ1, θ2)− x2(θ1, θ2)− θ0
)]
dF 1(θ1)dF
2(θ2)
s.t. x1(θ1, θ2) ≥ 0, x2(θ1, θ2) ≥ 0, x1(θ1, θ2) + x2(θ1, θ2) ≤ k ∀ θ1, θ2 (F)
In the next section, we determine the optimal caps x¯1(θ2) and x¯2(θ1).
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4.2 Optimal resource allocation with unknown needs
Consider an allocation rule where system i receives an allocation equal to its needs θi.
Denote by yj(θi) the optimal cap on the resources allocated to system j in this case. The
cap yj(θi) is continuous, non-increasing in θi and for 0 < yj(θi) < k−θi solves the following
equation (see Lemma 3 in Appendix A2):
αj E
[
u′j
(
yj(θi)− θj
) ∣∣∣ θj ≥ yj(θi)] = α0 u′0((k − θi − yj(θi))− θ0). (3)
This equation has an intuitive interpretation. Suppose that system i receives all the
resources it needs (θi). We simply have to determine how to optimally distribute the
remaining k − θi resources between systems 0 and j. The left hand side of (3) represents
the expected marginal benefit of assigning resources to system j conditional on those
resources being desirable, that is, on system j having needs exceeding the cap yj(θi).
The right hand side of (3) represents the marginal benefit of assigning them to system 0.
Optimal distribution of k− θi equates both marginal benefits. Moreover, it can be shown
that y′j(θi) ∈ (−1, 0): a one-unit increase in the needs of (and therefore in the resources
allocated to) system i reduces the cap on system j by less than one unit, thereby reducing
also the resources allocated to system 0.
Overall, (3) describes the cap on system j when system i receives its needs. Suppose
now that both systems are constrained and denote by k1 and k2 the optimal amount of
resources allocated to systems 1 and 2 in that case, with k0 = k− k1− k2. Whenever they
are all positive, the values (k0, k1, k2) solve the following system of equations
α1E
[
u′1
(
k1 − θ1
) ∣∣∣ θ1 ≥ k1] = α2E[u′2(k2 − θ2) ∣∣∣ θ2 ≥ k2] = α0u′0(k0 − θ0), (4)
which has the same interpretation as before: the marginal benefit of allocating resources
to system 0 equals the expected marginal benefit of allocating resources to either of the
constrained systems 1 and 2. Note from (3) and (4) that y1(k2) = k1 and y2(k1) = k2.
With these premises in mind, we are in a position to characterize M, the mechanism
that solves problem P.
Proposition 1 (Characterization) The optimal mechanism M is characterized by the
following caps x¯∗1(θ2) and x¯∗2(θ1):
x¯∗1(θ2) =
{
y1(θ2) if θ2 < k2
k1 if θ2 ≥ k2 and x¯
∗
2(θ1) =
{
y2(θ1) if θ1 < k1
k2 if θ1 ≥ k1
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Let us first understand what mechanism M implies for the equilibrium allocations to
systems 1 and 2 which, from now on, are denoted by x∗1(θ1, θ2) and x∗2(θ1, θ2). According to
Proposition 1, system j has a guaranteed minimum level of resources kj . This means that,
if its needs are θj ≤ kj , they are fully satisfied and the resulting performance is flawless.
If, on the other hand, its needs are θj > kj , then system j receives extra resources only
if system i is satiated. The amount by which the resources to j are increased depends on
the marginal benefit of allocating them to 0 vs. j, as expressed in (3). Notice that this
allocation rule implies that when the needs of both 1 and 2 are above k1 and k2, none of
them receives resources above those levels. Finally, the resources that are not allocated to
systems 1 and 2 (if any) go to system 0.
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of the resources (x∗1(θ1, θ2), x∗2(θ1, θ2))
allocated to systems 1 and 2 under mechanism M for every pair of needs (θ1, θ2). The
dotted and bold lines represent the optimal caps on systems 1 and 2 as a function of the
needs of systems 2 and 1 respectively. The resulting final allocations are such that, in
the lower left quadrant (systems 1 and 2 have low needs), both systems receive all the
resources they need. In the upper right quadrant (systems 1 and 2 have high needs),
both systems receive fixed amounts. In the remaining two quadrants, the system with low
needs is unconstrained and the system with high needs is constrained by an amount that
depends negatively on the needs of the other system. The remaining resources x∗0(θ1, θ2) =
k − x∗1(θ1, θ2)− x∗2(θ1, θ2) are then allocated to system 0.
The intuition for the optimality of mechanism M is as follows. First, CES has for
each system i only one instrument at its disposal– the allocation xi– which dramatically
limits its scope for intervention.18 As established in Lemma 1, the best CES can do is
to set a cap x¯i on each system i. Because system i’s performance is (weakly) increasing
in the resources obtained, imposing a cap that depends non-trivially on i’s own report
cannot be incentive compatible. By contrast, as the needs of system j increase, so does
the opportunity cost of granting resources to system i. Therefore, the cap on system i
must be non-increasing in the report made by system j about its own needs. After a
certain threshold, however, system j is also capped and higher reports do not translate
into higher resources. At that point, the opportunity cost of allocating resources to system
i becomes constant and so does the cap on i. Combining these properties naturally leads
to the mechanism described in Proposition 1.
18Trading-off two instruments as in the traditional mechanism design literature is not possible in our
setting due to the absence of monetary transfers.
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Figure 1. Allocation (x∗1, x∗2) as a function of needs (θ1, θ2) in the optimal mechanism M.
x¯∗2(θ1)
x¯∗1(θ2)
From a technical viewpoint, we can establish a connection between our mechanism and
a prominent class of mechanisms studied in the social choice literature in a different but
related context (with single peaked rather than weakly-increasing preferences). Moulin
(2000) introduced the notion of “priority mechanism”, a rule that consists first in ranking
agents lexicographically and then sequentially allocating resources according to their needs
and the pre-specified priority order. The author characterizes some axiomatic properties
of this simple allocation rule. Interestingly, Proposition 1 shows that the mechanism
which maximizes social welfare (the sum of expected utilities of all agents) has a priority-
type format: if θi < ki then give priority to system i and divide the remaining resources
optimally between systems j and 0, and if both θ1 > k1 and θ2 > k2 then give a fixed
allocation kl to each system l.
The optimal mechanism M has an interesting property that we describe below.
Corollary 1 Under full information, the individual will always under-perform in the cog-
nitive tasks. Under incomplete information, the individual will perform flawlessly in simple
cognitive tasks and severely under-perform in difficult cognitive tasks.
Recall that under complete information, a system with positive needs always receives
fewer resources than desired. This implies that the individual always under-performs in
tasks 1 and 2. Under incomplete information, on the contrary, the individual performs
cognitive tasks flawlessly as long as they are simple enough. The result is illustrated in
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Figure 2. It represents the final allocation of resources to system i under complete in-
formation (dotted line) and incomplete information (full line) as a function of its needs
θi and for a given announcement θj by system j. As the needs of system i increase, the
allocation obtained by that system under M is fully responsive up to a level (dx∗i /dθi = 1)
and non-responsive afterwards (dx∗i /dθi = 0). This is to be contrasted with the full in-
formation case in which the allocation is always below optimal and strictly increases with
the needs. The result has two immediate implications. First, only under incomplete in-
formation a multi-tasking individual may perform both cognitive tasks flawlessly. Second,
performance in a cognitive task under complete information exceeds performance under
incomplete information if and only if needs are above a certain threshold, that is, the
cognitive task is sufficiently difficult.
-
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Figure 2. Allocations xFi and x
∗
i as a function of the needs θi.
4.3 Comparative statics
We now study how the optimal allocation rule is affected by changes in the resources
available and the relative importance of the performance of systems. Consider the optimal
mechanism M given the parameters (α0, α1, α2, θ0, k). We have the following result.
Proposition 2 (Comparative statics) The resources x∗l (θ1, θ2) allocated to system l
(weakly) increase if αl or k increase or if α−l decreases. Also, x∗i (θ1, θ2) decreases and
x∗0(θ1, θ2) increases if θ0 increases.
The comparative statics follow a general resource monotonicity principle which can be
summarized as “abundance is shared and relative importance is compensated.” If a system
becomes more valuable for CES (due, for example, to an increase in the marginal cost of
under-performance), it receives more resources at the expense of both the other systems.
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Conversely, if new resources become available (k increases), then all systems benefit from
this surplus.19
Changes in α0 are interesting. If shortages in the amount granted to the motor skill
task become less and less costly (α0 decreases), systems 1 and 2 receive more resources
(yi(θj) increases for all θj). They also become less sensitive to each other’s demands
(|y′i(θj)| decreases for all θj), because higher needs of system j come more at the expense
of system 0 and less at the expense of system i. Eventually, x∗0 hits the non-negativity
constraint. Once this occurs, system 0 receives no resources and the problem reduces to
allocating a fixed amount k between systems 1 and 2.
The optimal mechanism M and the comparative statics can be illustrated with the
following stylized analytical example.20
Example 1 (Uniform-Quadratic) Suppose that performance is quadratic for all xl ≤ θl
and needs in the cognitive tasks are uniformly distributed: ul(a) = −a2 and θi ∼ U[0, θi].
To reduce the number of parameters, let θ0 = k. Using (3)-(4), we get:
yi(θj) =
αiθi
αi + 2α0
− 2α0
αi + 2α0
θj and ki =
αiαjθi + 2α0αiθi − 2α0αjθj
αiαj + 2α0αi + 2α0αj
where the slope of the cap function is constant: y′i(θj) = − 2α0αi+2α0 ∈ (−1, 0).
One may want to give a quantitative assessment of the efficiency of our optimal second-
best mechanism M relative to some alternatives. To this end, we compare the performance
of M in Example 1 to the first-best full information mechanism and to two third-best
simpler mechanisms: one where system i receives priority and the remaining resources
are optimally distributed between 0 and j, and another where system 0 receives priority
(given Assumption 2, in this last case no resources are left to systems 1 or 2).
Example 2 (Performance Comparison) Suppose that αl = 1 for all l, ul(a) = −a2,
θi ∼ U[0, 1], and θ0 − k ≡ r ∈ [0, 1/2]. Figure 3 represents the expected utility of CES
as a function of r under four different mechanisms: (i) First-best (Full Information), (ii)
Second-best (Mechanism M), (iii) Priority to i, and (iv) Priority to 0.21
19This comparative statics is consistent with experiments in which subjects have to exercise self control
and make effortful choices after drinking lemonade containing either glucose or a substitute (Masicampo
and Baumeister (2008)). Performance was significantly higher for subjects who drank glucose suggesting
the positive effect of extra resources in the bloodstream.
20The algebraic details in Examples 1 and 2 are omitted for brevity but are available from the authors.
21We restrict attention to r ≤ 1/2 so that system 0 is not overwhelmingly important (for instance it
is trivial that when r = 1 Full Information, Mechanism M and Priority to 0 perform identically simply
because all three mechanisms allocate all the resources to system 0, the system with greatest needs).
17
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
-1.4
-1.3
-1.2
-1.1
-1.0
-0.9
-0.8
-0.7
-0.6
-0.5
-0.4
r
Performance
1
Figure 3. CES utility under full information (light thick line), mechanism M (dashed
line), Priority to i (dotted line) and Priority to 0 (dark thin line).
When r = 0, M performs substantially better than other simple mechanisms: utility
under M is about 20% lower than under first-best whereas utility under priority to i or
priority to 0 is about 60% lower than under first-best. As r increases, the inefficiency of
Priority to i increases whereas the inefficiency of Priority to 0 decreases relative to M
simply because, other things being equal, higher needs of system 0 (i.e., higher r) implies
that more resources should be granted to that system.
4.4 Implementation
The solution described in Proposition 1 represents a normative upper bound on the ef-
ficiency of the resource allocation problem. A direct revelation mechanism where each
system ‘communicates’ its needs truthfully given the ‘commitment’ by CES to split re-
sources following a pre-determined rule is nothing but an abstract formalization of the
problem. Indeed, although systems may not be able to literally send messages to CES,
they can signal their needs through the usage of the processing resources made available to
them. As discussed in Appendix A1, the direct revelation and signal-through-consumption
mechanisms can be formally equivalent. However, that approach is still fairly abstract.
The purpose of this section is to determine whether the efficient allocation rule can be
reached using a simple and biologically plausible process. Assume that the tasks must
be completed between time 0 and time k, and only one unit of processing resources is
delivered at each instant. We may think of processing resources as metabolic resources
that can be used to efficiently transmit a signal.
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Proposition 3 (Implementation) M can be implemented with the following mechanism
M′:
(i) CES sends resources to system l at a constant rate rl = kl/k.
(ii) As long as i and j consume resources, the flow rates (r0, r1, r2) are maintained. If
i stops consuming at time t˜, then resources are redirected to j and 0 at revised rates νj
and 1− νj, such that rj t˜+ νj(k − t˜) = yj(rit˜).
(iii) If both i and j stop consuming, all the remaining resources are redirected to 0.
Mechanism M′ follows the biological principles highlighted in the introduction. CES
sends resources simultaneously to the systems in charge of performing tasks. The systems
deplete the resources, and depletion is (correctly) interpreted by CES as a signal that
more resources are needed. The process is dynamic but extremely fast. If one system
stops consuming, no further resources are sent to it. Mechanism M′ is extraordinarily
simple for systems: it just requires them to grab any incoming resources until they are
satiated. It means in particular that, for the optimal mechanism to work, each system’s
knowledge about the existence and needs of other systems is virtually nil. In fact, systems
do not even need to know their own needs at any point in time, only whether an extra unit
of resources is valuable or not. On the other hand, the mechanism requires a certain degree
of sophistication by CES, which must be able to select different flow rates for different
systems and be ready to redirect resources when some needs are satiated. We conjecture
that the activity measured in the LPFC in the dual-task experiments reviewed in section
2.1 (D’Esposito et al., 1995; Szameitat et al., 2002, and others) captures this extra top-
down involvement of CES in the coordination and allocation of “attentional resources.”
However, this is somewhat speculative since the precise implications of increased levels of
blood oxygenation in LPFC are not known with certainty.
5 Task inertia and performance improvements
In this section we study the sequential allocation of resources. To this purpose consider the
following extension of the basic model. Suppose that CES has imperfect knowledge of the
distribution F i(·) from which the needs of system i ∈ {1, 2} are drawn. More precisely,
there is an underlying state si ∈ Si = [si, si] that determines the distribution of needs
for system i. For example, suppose the individual performs an auditory comprehension
task which is often (though not always) complex. Then, the auditory system will often
(though, again, not always) require substantial resources. This is formally captured by an
underlying state si that places high probability on auditory needs being large.
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We order the states from highest likelihood of small needs to highest likelihood of large
needs, and assume that a (strict) Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP) holds.22
Assumption 3 (MLRP)
d
dθi
(
f isi(θi|si)
f i(θi|si)
)
> 0 ∀ i, θi, si.
According to this assumption, needs increase (in a stochastic sense) as we move towards
a higher state. Stated differently, the state si is a parameter that captures how complex
the task is likely to be, and therefore how important the needs are likely to be. When the
individual performs tasks only once, the problem is identical to the one studied previously,
as CES is not interested in states per se but only as a way to identify more accurately the
needs of systems. To see this, suppose the state si is drawn from a known distribution
P i(si) with density p
i(si), and that states are independent across systems (p
i(si|sj) =
pi(si) for all sj).
23 The probability that system i has needs θi is:
gi(θi) =
∫ si
si
f i(θi|si)pi(si)dsi (5)
We can then perform the very same analysis as before where f i(·) is replaced by gi(·).
The problem becomes more interesting when the individual performs the same set of
tasks in consecutive periods. We assume that si remains constant over time. At each date
t and conditional on the state si, the needs of system i are drawn independently from
F i(θi|si). The past realization of needs then conveys information about the state, which
itself informs about the distribution of present needs. Formally and applying Bayes rule,
the probability that the needs of system i at date t are θti given that its needs at date t−1
were θt−1i is:
gi(θti |θt−1i ) =
∫ si
si
f i(θti |si)pi(si|θt−1i )dsi =
∫ si
si
f i(θti |si)f i(θt−1i |si)pi(si)dsi∫ si
si
f i(θt−1i |si)pi(si)dsi
(6)
The following lemma is a key step for our subsequent analysis.
Lemma 2 Under Assumption 3,
d
dθti
giθt−1i (θti | θt−1i )
gi(θti |θt−1i )
 > 0 ∀ i, θti , θt−1i .
22Subscripts in c.d.f. or density functions denote partial derivatives with respect to that argument.
23If states are not independent, then θi and θj are correlated. The optimal mechanism must then exploit
this correlation, as it is well known in the mechanism design literature.
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According to Lemma 2, MLRP begets MLRP : if the individual experiences high needs
at some date, it means that the state is likely to be high (in an MLRP sense), and therefore
that needs are likely to be high also in the future (again, in an MLRP sense).
The dynamic allocation of needs in the framework developed above has some new
features. Suppose that, at the end of each date t, CES learns what the needs of each
system were at that date. This occurs for example if the performance Πi(·) of system i is
observed after system i has performed the task: the individual receives feedback about its
performance and this is interpreted by CES. Then, the needs reported by systems at some
date affect current allocations but not future allocations. Hence, independently of whether
system i is myopic (most likely) or forward-looking (least likely), it will ‘communicate’ its
needs in order to optimize exclusively its present allocation. The mechanism M developed
in Proposition 1 as well as the implementation procedure M′ described in Proposition 3
remain optimal at each date t, where f i(θi) is simply replaced by g
i(θti | θt−1i ) updated
using the posterior pi(si | θt−1i ). This mechanism, however, has new interesting properties.
Proposition 4 (Task inertia) The resources x∗it(θ
t
1, θ
t
2) allocated to system i at date t
(weakly) increase if θt−1i increases or if θ
t−1
j decreases.
The idea is simple. If CES realizes that the needs of system i in the previous period
were high, it concludes that state si is likely to be high which, other things being equal,
shifts the updated distribution of system i’s future needs towards high values. As a result,
it becomes optimal to grant more resources to system i in the current period, that is, to
set a higher cap. Given our resource monotonicity property, a more generous allocation
to system i comes necessarily at the expense of both systems 0 and j.
Using Proposition 1, we can then compare two models. In the first one, CES knows at
the beginning of each date t the needs (θt1, θ
t
2) of systems 1 and 2 (the ‘full information’ case,
as in section 3). In the second one, CES does not know at the beginning of date t the needs
(θt1, θ
t
2) of systems 1 and 2 (the ‘incomplete information’ case, as in section 4). In both
models, however, needs are revealed to CES at the end of date t. Also, since the underlying
state is unknown, there is learning over time about si in both models, and therefore about
the distribution f i(θi|si). These two models yield two different implications for observed
behavior that are summarized below.
Corollary 2 In a dynamic multi-task setting, the expected future performance at any time
t′ > t evaluated at time t is constant under full information while it improves over time
under incomplete information.
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With full information, the resource allocation rule of CES does not depend on his
assessment of the state. Still, higher states lead to (stochastically) higher needs and there-
fore lower expected performance whereas lower states lead to lower needs and therefore
higher expected performance. From the perspective of date t, however, learning about
the state may go in either direction, hence the constant expected performance under full
information. With incomplete information, a new effect appears. Over time, CES learns
about si through the realization of θi. This reduces the information asymmetry between
CES and system i, which results in an improved expected performance. The conclusion is
in line with experimental evidence. Subjects tend to adapt their behavior and obtain bet-
ter outcomes in the presence of feedback about performance even when there is nothing to
‘learn’ about the characteristics of the task. In a sense, the result rationalizes performance
improvements purely through practice or task repetition.
Proposition 4 has also an immediate but important implication regarding the existence
or non-existence of a link between the past needs of a system and its current allocation.
Corollary 3 Under full information, the allocation rule at each date t depends exclusively
on the present needs. Under asymmetric information it depends on the present needs and
also on the history of needs.
With full information, present needs are a sufficient statistic to determine the optimal
allocation. It then follows that learning about si allows CES to better predict future
performance but does not vary the way it distributes resources at future dates. In other
words, the allocation rule at any time is, conditional on the current needs, independent of
the history of needs. With incomplete information, however, the optimal allocation mech-
anism depends on the distribution from which needs are drawn. Learning about si thus
leads to a history-dependent allocation rule: higher past needs of system i reflects a higher
likelihood of present needs inducing a more favorable treatment by CES through a higher
consumption cap. This more favorable treatment translates into a higher performance of
system i at the expense of systems j and 0.
Task inertia and the resulting history-dependent allocation and performance is a par-
ticularly interesting result in the light of the recent neuroscience research. Indeed, suppose
that for the first few periods the task performed by system i is more complex than the
task performed by system j. Not surprisingly, resources are primarily directed to system i.
Suppose now that, at some point, there is a reversion in complexity. There is substantial
fMRI evidence of residual activity right after the change in the previously crucial but now
unimportant system i. Conversely too few resources are allocated to the previously unim-
portant but now crucial system j following the reversion in complexity. This misallocation
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vanishes after a few periods. Behaviorally, it translates into a short-term lowered perfor-
mance (slower response and more mistakes) in the task for which system j is responsible
(Wylie and Allport (2000), Monsell (2003), Yeung et al. (2006)). Neuroscientists argue
that this phenomenon is due to what they call a “task inertia” or a “task switching cost.”
However, the evidence on the existence of such switching cost is not accompanied by an
understanding of where it comes from and why it vanishes rapidly. In order to generate
this effect in a model with full information, we would need to impose some ad-hoc cost of
adaptation. Perhaps more satisfactorily, our model shows that inertia arises naturally un-
der incomplete information. The model thus proposes an explanation for why adaptation
to a changing environment may take a few iterations, and therefore offers a foundation for
theories that take this result as an assumption.
Last, the biologically plausible mechanism M′ discussed in Proposition 3 has a natural
implication in the multi-period framework.
Corollary 4 In a dynamic multi-task setting, mechanism M′ predicts that the initial rate
of resources sent to system i at date t increases when θt−1i increases. If, in equilibrium,
the needs of system i are satiated (θti < x¯
∗
it(θj)), the individual completes that task faster
the higher the past needs.
It suffices to apply Proposition 3 to each period. Interestingly, the rates ri and νi will
change over time as a function of past needs. It comes immediately from Proposition 4
that the initial rates allocated to task i at date t increase if θt−1i increases and if θ
t−1
j
decreases: more resources are sent if the task is expected to be more difficult given the
feedback obtained. This also implies that the task should be completed faster at date t
as processing resources are available more rapidly, providing another testable implication
of the theory.
6 The architecture of brain systems: integration vs. spe-
cialization
So far, we have assumed that each system performs exactly one task. In reality, systems
are responsible for multiple tasks and tasks require the coordination of multiple systems.
There are numerous reasons for such an organization of the brain. In this section, we focus
on one specific aspect that builds on the core premise of our theory: restricted channels of
communication. More precisely, we study from a purely informational viewpoint the trade-
off between integrating the two cognitive tasks into one system vs. specializing systems
into performing one cognitive task each.
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Specialization corresponds to the case already analyzed in section 4, where each cogni-
tive task is performed by a different system with private knowledge of needs. Integration
is modeled as follows. There is one system, denoted by I, which encompasses systems 1
and 2: it knows the needs θ1 and θ2, undertakes tasks 1 and 2, and cares about the sum
of performances in those tasks. Formally:
ΠI(x1, x2; θ1, θ2) ≡ Π1(x1; θ1) + Π2(x2; θ2)
We impose the following assumptions. First, under integration, CES can only choose
which resources are allocated to system I and which are allocated to system 0. System
I, who knows the relative needs in tasks 1 and 2, then decides how to split its resources
between tasks 1 and 2. Second, for analytic tractability we restrict attention to quadratic
performance functions:
u0(x0 − θ0) = −(1− γ)(x0 − θ0)2 and ui(xi − θi) = −γ (xi − θi)2
where γ ∈ [0, 1] captures the importance of the cognitive tasks relative to the motor skill
task in the overall performance function. As we will develop below, the main objective
of this section is to determine which brain architecture is more efficient as a function of
this parameter. Finally, we also focus on the case where θ1 + θ2 = k. We impose this
assumption to be in the interesting situation where integration and specialization yield
identical performance if either γ = 0 or γ = 1. In the former case, only the motor skill
task matters and optimality requires x0 = k. In the latter case, only the cognitive tasks
matter and first best can be achieved by setting x1 = θ1 and x2 = θ2.
24 Proposition 5
discusses which brain architecture dominates when γ ∈ (0, 1).
Proposition 5 (Brain architecture) Assume θ1+θ2 = k, f1(θ1)f2(θ2) > 0 and quadratic
performance functions. There exist γ and γ with 0 < γ ≤ γ < 1 such that, from the view-
point of CES, integration dominates specialization for all γ ∈ (0, γ) and specialization
dominates integration for all γ ∈ (γ, 1).
From a purely informational perspective, integration has both benefits and costs. On
the one hand, system I knows θ1 and θ2, so it can compute the relative value of allocating
resources to task 1 vs. task 2. Moreover, there is congruence with the interests of CES on
this relative value. Therefore, for a given amount of resources allocated to the cognitive
24If we assume θ1 + θ2 > k, then integration dominates specialization when γ = 1 (and therefore also
when γ → 1) but for ad-hoc reasons. Indeed, when γ = 1, all the resources are directed to tasks 1 and 2.
Since resources are sometimes scarce (θ1 + θ2 > k for some (θ1, θ2)), it is efficient to have system I (which
by assumption knows the relative needs in those tasks) deciding how to split k between the two.
24
tasks, the integrated system I performs a split between the two which is optimal from the
viewpoint of CES. On the other hand, system I does not care about the performance in task
0, therefore all the resources granted to I are allocated to task 1 or task 2 independently
of the opportunity cost of allocating them to system 0. This contrasts with the separation
case where the marginal benefits of granting resources to each system are jointly taken
into consideration when determining the optimal caps of systems 1 and 2.
According to Proposition 5, specialization is preferred when the importance of the
cognitive tasks is high relative to the motor skill task (γ > γ) and integration is preferred
when the importance of the cognitive tasks is low relative to the motor skill task (γ < γ).25
Intuitively, when the cognitive tasks are important, the majority of resources are allocated
to tasks 1 and 2. It then becomes relatively more valuable to get extra information about
the needs in each of these tasks in order to determine how much to grant to task 0. This
is obtained through specialization. Conversely, when the motor skill task is very valuable,
most of the resources are allocated to system 0 anyway. At the margin, it is then important
to optimize the (few) resources granted to the cognitive tasks, and this is achieved through
integration.
Figure 4 depicts the equilibrium allocation as a function of needs under integration
(bold line) assuming kˆ resources are optimally allocated to system I. The allocation under
specialization is the same as mechanism M in Figure 1, and it is superimposed in the graph
(dotted lines). Two differences between the integration and specialization mechanisms
deserve emphasis. First, under integration the amount of resources consumed in task i are
θi if θ1 + θ2 ≤ kˆ and xˆi(θ1, θ2) < θi if θ1 + θ2 > kˆ. It means that, in equilibrium, the needs
in either none or both cognitive tasks are constrained. This contrasts with specialization
which has four regions so that, for some parameters, the needs of one and only one task
are constrained. Second and by construction, under integration the cap is set on total
resources for the cognitive tasks, so lower needs in task i do not result in spillovers for
task 0 unless system j is satiated. Again, this contrasts with specialization, where lower
needs by system i always result in more resources for both system j and system 0.
An immediate implication of Proposition 5 with intuitive appeal is summarized below.
Corollary 5 Different cognitive tasks should be performed by different systems if cognitive
tasks are crucial for CES and by the same system if they are not.
25We show for a parametric example (θi ∼ U [0, 1] and α1 = α2) that γ = γ. Unfortunately, the
uniqueness of the cutoff does not extend to other cases so, in general, we cannot determine what happens
when γ ∈ [γ, γ].
25
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7 Discussion and conclusions
Incorporating choice imperfections in the decisions of agents has become central to behav-
ioral economics. Observed behaviors or “outputs” such as empirical evidence, experimental
data or sometimes mere introspection have been the main source of inspiration for mod-
els of bounded rationality. The premise of the present research is that “inputs” such as
physiological constraints in our ability to perceive events, process information, and select
between options should also be used as building blocks for new theories of decision making.
This paper follows this alternative route. It determines the constrained optimal allocation
of resources to brain systems when multiple tasks are performed simultaneously. It shows
that the optimal mechanism takes a resource cap structure and that it can be implemented
using a simple and biologically plausible procedure. Some implications of the theory are
discussed, most notably the inverse relation between task difficulty and performance, the
endogenous emergence of task inertia and the conditions for the optimality of task in-
tegration. A natural next step would be to test this theory in a controlled laboratory
setting. Given the existing research by Baumeister and co-authors on self-control and
multi-tasking, this area seems a good candidate for such test. For example, our theory
predicts that subjects who find it more difficult to exert self-control should perform worse
in unrelated tasks.
Although our theory is motivated by the neurobiology of the brain, the model can also
26
be applied to more traditional areas of economics. For example, it can be straightforwardly
reinterpreted as a manager in a firm whose objective is to allocate scarce funds between
self-interested units (research, production, marketing, etc.) given private information of
needs.26 It can also capture the decision problem of colluding firms who decide how to
split the market without using side transfers that would provide compromising evidence
of their illegal activities. Other natural applications include provision of private goods to
a group of individuals and lobbying activities in political contexts.
As a final point, economists often express reservations about the idea that brain systems
may have competing goals. In particular, wouldn’t it be more efficient if every subpart
pursued the common good? There are evolutionary, physiological and empirical arguments
against a common interest approach. First, the well-known neural Darwinism (Edelman,
1987) and neuronal selectionism (Changeux, 1985) theories provide models where neuronal
groups within the brain compete with each other for stimulus and reward resources.27
Second, and paradoxically, a cooperative approach would require a greater degree of brain
connectivity and sophistication. Indeed, each system would have to be able either to
‘communicate’ its needs back to the central decision-maker or to perform a non-trivial
marginal analysis and give up worthy resources whenever these are more valuable to other
systems. Instead, the physiological evidence reviewed in section 2.1 points towards a
lack of information flowing from systems to CES (possibly due to the scarcity of the
energetically costly neural connections) and a simplistic ‘deplete-until-satiation’ behavior
of neurons in the decision systems. These two features are consistent with our mechanism
M′. Third, some of the empirical regularities discussed in the paper (for example, the
possibility of flawless behavior and the prevalence of task inertia) arise naturally in our
non-cooperative model with private information but would not be present in a model with
common objectives. In any case, we believe that system competition provides at the very
least a plausible alternative to the cooperative ‘team theoretic’ approach.
26As mentioned in section 2.2, the literature on organizations has studied related questions. However,
to our knowledge a problem with two actions and two agents with private information and where the
organization cannot price resources has not been addressed before. The implications for inertia in organi-
zations and the trade-off integration vs. specialization of units within an organization are also potentially
important for the theory of the internal organization of the firm.
27Under this approach, biological evolution encourages fitness of the neuronal system, rather than fitness
at a higher level (the individual) or a lower level (the gene). See Tooby and Cosmides (1992) for an
evolutionary theory of internal conflicts in changing environments. See also Livnat and Pippenger (2006)
and Bisin and Iantchev (2010) for models highlighting the evolutionary advantages of having modules with
non-congruent objectives.
One could also build evolutionary theories where Nature shapes the performance functions of systems (as
in Robson (2001) or Rayo and Robson (2013) for example) to internalize the opportunity cost of resources.
Whether such approach would result in selfish, fully cooperative or partially cooperative systems is an
open question of considerable interest.
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Appendix
A1. Interpreting the direct revelation mechanism
Suppose there are two stages. In stage τ ∈ {1, 2}, CES allocates a local budget to each
system (yτ1 , y
τ
2 ). A budget is a function of past “messages”, which in our case corresponds
to past “consumptions”. We denote by mτi the consumption of system i in stage τ .
In stage 2, the resources needed by system i are r2i and its allocation is y
2
i (m
1
1,m
1
2).
It is optimal to consume exactly what is needed or, if this is not possible, to deplete the
local budget:
m2i
(
y2i (m
1
1,m
1
2), r
2
i
)
= min
{
y2i (m
1
1,m
1
2), r
2
i
}
In stage 1, the resources needed by system i are θi and its allocation is y
1
i . Consumption
cannot exceed the allocation (m1i 6 y1i ). If θi < y1i , then it is (weakly) optimal to consume
m1i = θi. If θi > y
1
i , system i chooses m
1
i and the ex-post utility is:
αi ui
(
m1i + min
{
y2i (m
1
1,m
2
1), θi −m1i
}− θi)
where stage 2 needs are replaced by total needs minus stage 1 consumption. We look for
a solution in dominant strategies, that is:
αi ui
(
m1i + min
{
y2i (m
1
i ,m
1
j ), θi −m1i
}− θi) > αi ui (m˜1i + min{y2i (m˜1i ,m1j ), θi − m˜1i}− θi)
for all m1i 6 y1i and m˜1i 6 y1i , yielding a solution m1∗i (θi, y1i ). At equilibrium, sys-
tem i consumes m1∗i (θi, y
1
i ) in stage 1. He receives y
2
i (m
1∗
i (θi, y
1
i ),m
1∗
j (θj , y
1
j )) in stage
2 and consumes m2∗i (θi, θj , y
1
i , y
1
j ) = min
{
y2i (m
1∗
i (θi, y
1
i ),m
1∗
j (θj , y
1
j )), θi − y1i
}
. Total
consumption is m1∗i (θi, y
1
i ) + m
2∗
i (θi, θj , y
1
i , y
1
j ) which, by construction, is less than y
1
i +
y2i (m
1∗
i (θi, y
1
i ),m
1∗
j (θj , y
1
j )).
Let xi(θi, θj , y
1
i , y
1
j ) = m
1∗
i (θi, y
1
i ) +m
2∗
i (θi, θj , y
1
i , y
1
j ). Again by construction, for all θj
and for all y1i , y
1
j , we have:
αi ui
(
xi(θi, θj , y
1
i , y
1
j )− θi
)
> αi ui
(
xi(θ
′
i, θj , y
1
i , y
1
j )− θi
)
which means that the two-stage mechanism where stage 2 budget depends on stage 1
consumption is formally equivalent to a direct mechanism where, for any initial local
budgets (y11, y
1
2), each system i is asked to report its total needs θi and receives a final
allocation xi that is divided among the two stages. The mechanism is direct and incentive
compatible in dominant strategies. Moreover, for any such mechanisms with initial budgets
(y11, y
1
2), there exists an equivalent mechanism with no budget in stage 1. That mechanism
is itself equivalent to a static mechanism in which all resources are allocated in stage 2.
We can thus restrict to such mechanisms.
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A2. Proof of Lemmas and Propositions
A. Proof of Lemma 1
We proceed in two steps. We first show that any mechanism that solves CES problem must
be ex-post efficient. We then show that, given Assumption 2, the class of strategy-proof,
ex-post efficient mechanisms is contained in M.
Consider an arbitrary mechanism D,
D (θ1, θ2) = (x0 (θ1, θ2) , x1 (θ1, θ2) , x2 (θ1, θ2)),
which is feasible, strategy-proof but not ex-post efficient. We can then construct a feasible,
strategy-proof mechanism D′ that increases the CES performance, implying that D does
not solve the problem of CES. It follows from Assumption 2 that a feasible mechanism is
not ex-post efficient if and only if for some i ∈ {1, 2} there exists a profile (θ1, θ2) such
that xi (θ1, θ2) > θi, that is system i obtains excess resources. In particular, feasibility
and Assumption 2 imply that system 0 can never obtain excess resources. Denote by Ψi
the set of states in which system i ∈ {1, 2} obtains resources above needs, and define the
mechanism D′ that follows D except for (θ1, θ2) ∈ Ψi, i ∈ {1, 2} in which case we have:
D′ (θ1, θ2) =

x′0 (θ1, θ2) = x0 (θ1, θ2) + (xi (θ1, θ2)− θi) ,
x′i (θ1, θ2) = θi,
x′j (θ1, θ2) = xj (θ1, θ2) ,
if (θ1, θ2) ∈ Ψi.
That is, D′ assigns to system 0 the excess resources of other systems. It is clear
that the expected utility of CES increases if the equilibrium allocation rule follows D′
instead of D. It remains to show that D′ is strategy-proof. First, for (θ1, θ2) ∈ Ψi,
system i achieves the same (maximum) performance with the new mechanism D′ as with
the previous mechanism D. Second, the allocation to system i does not become more
desirable to any other type θ′i. Third, system j’s allocation does not change in Ψi. These
three observations imply that if D is strategy-proof, so is D′.
We next show that the set of allocations induced by system i when system j reports
θj , Xi(θj) = {xi (θi, θj) : θi ∈ Θi} for any strategy-proof, ex-post efficient mechanism must
be an interval. Strategy-proofness then implies a “cap structure” as in (2). Suppose,
by way of contradiction, that for some θj , Xi(θj) is not an interval. This implies that
there exist two elements xi,x
′
i ∈ Xi(θj), xi < x′i, with (xi, x′i) ∩ Xi(θj) = ∅. Let θi =
inf {θi ∈ Θi : xi (θi, θj) = x′i} be the minimum type that induces allocation x′i. First, ex-
post efficiency implies that θi ≥ x′i. Second, letting θ′′i ∈ (xi, x′i), incentive compatibility
requires that xi (θ
′′
i , θj) = x
′
i, implying that θi ≤ θ′′i thus violating θi ≥ x′i. Having reached
a contradiction it thus follows that Xi(θj) is an interval. 2
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B. Proof of Proposition 1
The proof of Proposition 1 will be based on Lemmas 3, 4 and 5.
Lemma 3 Define a i −priority mechanism to be a mechanism where CES assigns re-
sources θi to system i. The optimal strategy-proof i −priority mechanism Pi allocates
resources according to:
xi(θ1, θ2) = min {θi, k} ,
xj(θ1, θ2) = min {θj , yj(θi)} ,
x0(θ1, θ2) = k − xi(θ1, θ2)− xj(θ1, θ2),
where yj(θi) is continuous, non increasing and at each point of differentiability we have
y′j(θi) ∈ [−1, 0]. If 0 < yj(θi) < k − θi then yj(θi) is the unique solution to:
αjE
[
u′j (yj(θi)− θj) | θj ≥ yj(θi)
]
= α0u
′
0 (k − θi − yj(θi)− θ0) ,
and y′j(θi) ∈ (−1, 0).
Proof. Under an i −priority mechanism CES assigns resources θi to system i as long
as it does not violate the resource constraint θi ≤ k. Therefore xi (θ1, θ2) = min{θi, k}.
We first restrict attention to i −priority mechanisms that set a cap on the resources
allocated to system j, i.e. xj (θ1, θ2) = min{θj , yj(θi)}, and we characterize the mechanism
Pi with an optimal cap yj(θi). We then show that Pi is optimal in the general class of
strategy-proof i −priority mechanisms.
(a) Optimal cap yj(θi).
The expected performance when system i announces θi and resources k
′ = k − θi are
distributed between systems 0 and j by imposing a resource cap yj(θi) on system j is
(omitting the dependence of yj(θi) on θi to avoid clutter)
Jj(yj) =
∫ θj
yj
αjuj (yj − θj) dF j(θj) +
∫
Θj
α0u0 (x0 (θj)− θ0) dF j(θj),
where x0 (θj) = k
′ − θj if θj ≤ yj and x0 (θj) = k′ − yj if θj > yj . The optimal cap yj
solves
max Jj(yj) s.t. 0 ≤ yj ≤ k′. (7)
We first show that Jj is quasiconcave in [0, k
′]. Define the function Hj as
Hj(yj) = E
[
u′j (yj − θj) | θj ≥ yj
]
. (8)
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By differentiating Jj we have
J ′j(yj) =
(
1− F j (yj)
) (
αjE
[
u′j (yj − θj) | θj ≥ yj
]− α0u′0 (k′ − yj − θ0)) =
=
(
1− F j (yj)
) (
αjHj(yj)− α0u′0
(
k′ − yj − θ0
))
. (9)
We now establish that αjHj(yj) − α0u′0 (k′ − yj − θ0) is non-increasing in yj by showing
that H ′j(yj) ≤ 0. Concavity of u0 would then complete the proof of this claim. To ease
notation define
Λ(yj) =
∫ θj
yj
(
u′j (yj − θj) +
u′′j (yj − θj)
h(yj)
)
dF j(θj),
so that totally differentiating (8) we have
H ′j(yj) =
Λ(yj)h(yj)
1− F j(yj) .
We now show that Λ(yj) ≤ 0. As u′′j ≤ 0, Assumption 1 implies that h(θj) ≥ h(yj), for
θj ≥ yj so that
u′′j (yj − θj)
h(yj)
≤ u
′′
j (yj − θj)
h(θj)
for θj ≥ yj .
Integration by parts provides the following identity∫ θj
yj
u′j (yj − θj) dF j(θj) = −
∫ θj
yj
u′′j (yj − θj) (1− F j(θj))dθj . (10)
Therefore
Λ(yj) ≤
∫ θj
yj
u′j (yj − θj) dF j(θj) +
∫ θj
yj
u′′j (yj − θj)
h(θj)
dF j(θj) =
= −
∫ θj
yj
u′′j (yj − θj) (1− F j(θj))dθj +
∫ θj
yj
u′′j (yj − θj) (1− F j(θj))dθj = 0.
As Λ(yj) ≤ 0 then H ′j(yj) ≤ 0 implying that J ′j(yj) changes sign at most once (from
positive to negative) and thus Jj is quasiconcave.
With these insights we can now solve (7). First, for yj = 0 to be a solution of (7) it
is necessary and sufficient that J ′j(0) ≤ 0 which is equivalent to αjHj(0) ≤ α0u′0 (k′ − θ0).
For yj = k
′ to be a solution of (7) it is necessary and sufficient that αjHj(k′) ≥ α0u′0 (−θ0).
In all other cases the maximizer of (7) is the unique solution to J ′j(yj) = 0 thus satisfying:
αjHj(yj) = α0u
′
0
(
k′ − yj − θ0
)
.
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Given the uniqueness of maximizer, the Maximum Theorem establishes the continuity
of yj(θi). Summarizing, the optimal threshold yj (θi) under Pi satisfies:
yj (θi) = 0 if αjHj(0) ≤ α0u′0 (k − θi − θ0) ,
yj (θi) = k − θi if αjHj(k − θi) ≥ α0u′0 (−θ0) ,
αjHj(yj) = α0u
′
0 (k − θi − yj − θ0) otherwise.
(11)
At any θi at which yj (θ
′
i) = k− θ′i for θ′i in a neighborhood of θi we have y′j (θi) = −1,
while at any point θi at which yj (θ
′
i) = 0 for θ
′
i in a neighborhood of θi we have y
′
j (θi) = 0.
We can implicitly differentiate (11) for any interior solution to find
y′j (θi) = −
α0u
′′
0 (k
′ − yj − θ0)
α0u′′0 (k′ − yj − θ0) + αjH ′j(yj)
∈ [−1, 0).
In particular, if h′j(θj) > 0 then H
′
j(yj) < 0 and y
′
j (θj) ∈ (−1, 0).
(b) Optimality of resource-cap priority mechanisms.
We prove the optimality of (11) in the class of strategy-proof i −priority mechanisms
following the same proof strategy as in Lemma 1: we show that, under an optimal mech-
anism, the set of resources awarded to system j is indeed an interval for any θi. To reach
a contradiction, suppose that this set is not an interval. That is, letting xij(θj) be the
resources awarded to system j when system i announces θi, then there exist θ
′
j < θ
′′
j such
that xij(θj) /∈ (θ′j , θ′′j ) with xij(θ′′j ) = θ′′j . As system j’s preferences are monotone, system j
would never demand resources θ′j when its needs exceed it, i.e. when θj > θ
′
j . If resources
(θ′j , θ
′′
j ) are ruled out, system j would obtain x
i
j(θj) ≥ θ′′j when θj > θ′j . We now show that
allowing all points in (θ′j , θ
′′
j ) increases the CES performance. By awarding system j the
amount θj when θj ∈ (θ′j , θ′′j ), the CES can allocate the remaining xij(θj)−θj ≥ θ′′j −θj > 0
to system 0, thus increasing its performance. Therefore, the mechanism that rules outs
(θ′j , θ
′′
j ) cannot be optimal. This implies that the optimal mechanism is continuous. It is
also immediate that the CES would never impose a binding lower bound on the resources
granted to system j, as eliminating such lower bound would free resources to be allocated
to system 0. Therefore the optimal mechanism Pi in the class of i −priority mechanisms
is given by (11). 2
Lemma 4 Let Hj(yj) = E
[
u′j (yj − θj) | θj ≥ yj
]
. The thresholds y2(θ1) and y1(θ2) in
the priority mechanisms P1 and P2 defined in Lemma 3 intersect if and only if there exist
θ˜1 and θ˜2 such that the following two conditions are satisfied:
α1H1(θ˜1)− α2H2(0) ≥ 0 with α2H2(0) = α0u′0
(
k − θ˜1 − θ0
)
,
α2H2(θ˜2)− α1H1(0) ≥ 0 with α1H1(0) = α0u′0
(
k − θ˜2 − θ0
)
.
(12)
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Furthermore, if h1(θ1) and h2(θ2) are strictly increasing and yi(θj) < k − θj then y2(θ1)
and y1(θ2) intersect at a single point.
Proof. We first show that if at least one of the conditions in (12) is not satisfied then
y1 (θ2) and y2 (θ1) never intersect. The functions y1(θ2) − y−12 (θ2) and y2(θ1) − y−11 (θ1)
are weakly increasing for θi ∈ [yi(0), yi(θj)] ∩ [0, θi], since at any point of differentiability
d(yi(θj) − y−1j (θj))/dθj = y′i(θj) − (1/y′j(y−1j (θj))) ≥ 0.28 Therefore, a necessary and
sufficient condition for y1 (θ2) and y2 (θ1) to never intersect is that either y1 (0)−y−12 (0) > 0
or y2 (0)− y−11 (0) > 0.
Consider first the case y1(0) − y−12 (0) > 0. In other words, under a 1 −priority
mechanism P1 there is a θ1 such that whenever system 1 requests at least θ1 system 2
obtains zero resources (y2(θ1) = 0) and θ1 < y1(0) ≤ k. By (11), the minimum value θ˜1
at which y2(θ˜1) = 0 satisfies α2H2(0) = α0u
′
0(k − θ˜1 − θ0). The condition y1(0) > θ˜1 can
be restated as requiring that the marginal effect on overall performance of increasing the
threshold to system 1 at θ˜1 must be positive, which from Lemma 3 implies:
α1H1(θ˜1)− α0u′0
(
k − θ˜1 − θ0
)
≥ 0.
Substituting the value of θ˜1 this requires:
α1H1(θ˜1)− α2H2(0) ≥ 0 with α2H2(0) = α0u′0
(
k − θ˜1 − θ0
)
.
Following a similar analysis, y2(0)− y−11 (0) > 0 if and only if:
α2H2(θ˜2)− α1H1(0) ≥ 0 with α1H1(0) = α0u′0
(
k − θ˜2 − θ0
)
.
Second, suppose that y1(θ2) < k − θ2 and y2 (θ1) < k − θ1, i.e. both yi(θj) are interior
solutions of (11) and suppose that the hazard rates are strictly increasing. We now show
that, given (12) is satisfied, then y2(θ1)−y−11 (θ1) = 0 has a unique solution. From h′2(θ2) >
0, h′1(θ1) > 0 and Lemma 3, it follows that 0 > y′2(θ1) > −1 and d(y−11 (θ1))/dθ1 < −1.
Taking both implications together, we have that the difference y2(θ1)− y−11 (θ1) is strictly
increasing in θ1 and thus changes sign at most once. Therefore if the curves y1 (θ2) and
y2 (θ1) intersect at an interior point, then they intersect only once. 2
Lemma 5 Let Θ+i =
{
θi : θj > x
∗
j (θi) ⇒ θi > x∗i (θj)
}
be the set of values θi such that
under an optimal mechanism M and for any (θi, θj) in which system j receives less than
θj, system i receives less than θi. If θ1 and θ2 are independent, then x
∗
j (θi) is constant in
Θ+i .
28It can be readily shown that any other point must entail a binding constraint yi(θj) = k− θj in which
case the functions yi(θj)− y−1j (θj) are continuous and weakly increasing.
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Proof. Let θi ∈ Θ+i . Then the optimal cap on system j, x∗j (θi), must satisfy the first order
condition: ∫ θj
x∗j
[
αju
′
j
(
x∗j − θj
)− α0u′0 (k − θ0 − (x∗j + xi (θi, θj))] dF j(θj) = 0.
By definition, if θj ≥ x∗j system i receives less than its needs when θi ∈ Θ+i . Therefore its
allocation xi (θi, θj) is independent of θi, xi (θi, θj) = x
∗
i (θj) . Then the FOC is independent
of θi and thus for all θi ∈ Θ+i , the optimum x∗j is independent of θi. 2
Using Lemmas 3, 4 and 5, we proceed to the characterization of the optimal mechanism
M.
Proof of Proposition 1: The first-order condition for x∗i (θj) when system j reports θj
is ∫ θj
x∗i
αiu
′
i (x
∗
i − θi) dF i(θi) =
∫ θi
x∗i
α0u
′
0 (k − θ0 − (x∗i + xj (θi, θj)) dF i(θi). (13)
From the proof of Lemma 3 the optimal cap on a system must be lower if other
systems are given more resources. This observation allows us to establish the following
facts regarding the allocation rule under an optimal mechanism M : (i) system i obtains at
least the same resources as under the priority mechanism Pj , and (ii) system i’s resources
never exceed those obtained under Pj when system j demands zero resources. Indeed,
since xj (θi, θj) = min {θj , xj (θi)} ≤ θj and the right hand side of (13) is increasing in
xj (θi, θj), we then have:
yi (θj) ≤ x∗i (θj) ≤ yi (0) . (14)
We consider first the case in which y1 (θ2) and y2 (θ1) intersect at an interior point
(Lemma 4). We characterize M by proving a series of properties implied by optimality.
(i) The sets Θ+i are non-empty.
Suppose that θ¯i > yi(0). From Lemma 4 we have that y2(0) < y
−1
1 (0), that is the maximum
resources granted to system 2 in a priority mechanism P1 (which occurs when system 1
demands zero) are less than the needs of system 2 that would lead system 1 to obtain
zero resources under P2. From (14), y2(0) represents an upper bound on the resources
that system 2 would obtain under M. Therefore, for every θ2 ≥ y2(0) we have θ2 ∈ Θ+2 as
system 2 is necessarily constrained. Lemma 4 also implies that y1(0) < y
−1
2 (0). Therefore,
for every θ1 ≥ y1(0) we have θ1 ∈ Θ+1 .
(ii) Mechanism M behaves like a priority mechanism Pi for θi ≤ ki
From Lemma 5, define ki = x
∗
i (θj) to be the constant cap for θj ∈ Θ+j . Then ki represents
the minimum resources guaranteed to system i in the sense that x∗i (θj) ≥ ki for all θj .
This is easy to see as xj (θi, θj) is monotone in θj so that the left hand side of (13) increases
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in θj . Therefore ki = x
∗
i
(
θ¯j
) ≤ minx∗i (θ¯j). This implies that for θi ≤ ki system i always
obtains its resource needs xi (θi, θj) = θi. Therefore, for θi ≤ ki the optimality condition
(13) is satisfied by x∗j (θi) = yj (θi).
(iii) Optimal guaranteed resources satisfy kj = yj (ki).
Define k∗i as the point of intersection of y1 (θ2) and y2 (θ1), i.e. k
∗
j = yj (k
∗
i ) . We now show
that ki = k
∗
i .
First, system 1 obtains at least resources k1 when θ1 > k1. This implies that the
resources obtained by system 2 cannot exceed those obtained under a priority mechanism
P1 when system 1 demands resources k1, i.e. x2 (θ1, θ2) ≤ x∗2 (θ1) ≤ y2 (k1) for θ1 >
k1. Therefore the optimal k1 that satisfies (13) is (weakly) higher than the cap under a
priority mechanism P2 when system 2 demanded resources y2 (k1) , i.e. k1 ≥ y1 (y2 (k1)) ,
or y2(k1)− y−11 (k1) ≥ 0. By Lemma 4, y2(θ1)− y−11 (θ1) is an increasing function implying
that
k1 ≥ k∗1. (15)
Analogously we obtain that k2 ≥ k∗2.
Second, system 2 always obtains at least resources k2 when θ2 ≥ k2. Therefore the
optimal k1 that satisfies (13) cannot exceed the cap under a priority mechanism P2 when
system 2 demands resources k2 , i.e.
k1 ≤ y1 (k2) . (16)
Combining (15) and (16) and k2 ≥ k∗2 we have
k1 ≤ y1 (k2) ≤ y1 (k∗2) = k∗1 ≤ k1.
A similar reasoning yields k2 = k
∗
2.
Finally, we also consider the case in which y1 (θ2) and y2 (θ1) never intersect. If yi (0)−
y−1j (0) > 0 then by Lemma 4 we have yj(θi) < y
−1
i (θi) for all θi which implies that
ki = yi(0). Therefore M is a priority mechanism Pi for θi ≤ yi(0) while it implements the
allocation xi (θ1, θ2) = ki and xj (θ1, θ2) = 0 for θi > yi (0). 2
C. Proof of Proposition 2
The thresholds yi(θj) are defined in (11). An increase in αi to α
′
i > αi relaxes the conditions
αiHi(0) > α0u
′
0 (k − θi − θ0) and αiHi(k−θj) ≥ α0u′0 (−θ0) implying that if yi(θj)(αi) ≥ 0
then yi(θj)(α
′
i) ≥ 0, and if yi(θj)(αi) = k − θj then yi(θj)(α′j) = k − θj . If yi(θj)(αi)
satisfies αiHi(yi(θj)) = α0u
′
0 (k − θj − yi(θj)− θ0), then implicitly differentiating we have
that ∂yi(θj)/∂αi > 0. In summary, if α
′
i > αi then yi (θj) (α
′
i) ≥ yi (θj) (αi) for all θj ∈
[θj , θj ]. Since yj(θi) does not depend on αi, we have x¯
∗
i (θj)(α
′
i) ≥ x¯∗i (θj)(αi), x¯∗j (θi)(α′i) ≤
x¯∗j (θi)(αi), and ki(α
′
i) ≥ ki(αi), kj(α′i) ≤ kj(αi).
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We now consider the comparative statics on α0, θ0 and k. Following a similar argument
as before, we can show that if α′0 > α0 or θ′0 > θ0 then optimal caps satisfy yi(θj)(α′0) ≤
yi(θj)(α0) and yi(θj)(θ
′
0) ≤ yi(θj)(θ0) for θj ∈ [0, θj ]. Now, let Hi(θi) as given by (8).
If ki(α0) > 0 and ki(θ0) > 0, from Proposition 1 we have that the guaranteed levels ki
satisfy:
α1H1(k1) = α2H2(k2) if k1 + k2 = k, (17)
α1H1(k1) = α2H2(k2) = α0u
′
0 (k − k1 − k2 − θ0) if k1 + k2 < k. (18)
We now show that both guaranteed levels are reduced for any of the following changes:
(i) α′0 > α0, (ii) θ′0 > θ0, or (iii) k′ < k. First consider the case (17). Then for any
α′0 > α0 or θ′0 > θ0 such that we still have k1 (α′0) + k2 (α′0) = k or k1 (θ′0) + k2 (θ′0) = k
the guaranteed levels do not change as (17) does not depend on α0 or θ0. Next suppose
that k1 + k2 < k. Then by the implicit function theorem applied to (18):
∂ki
∂α0
= −αjH
′
j(kj)u
′′
0(k˜ − θ0)
∆
and
∂ki
∂θ0
= −∂ki
∂k
= −α0αjH
′
j(kj)u
′′
0(k˜ − θ0)
∆
,
where k˜ = k1 + k2 and ∆ = α1α2H
′
1(k1)H
′
2(k2) + α0u
′′
0(k˜ − θ0)
(∑
j=1,2 αjH
′
j(kj)
)
> 0.
Therefore ∂ki/∂α0 < 0, ∂ki/∂k > 0 and ∂ki/∂θ0 < 0. 2
D. Proof of Proposition 3
Trivial to check once we note that if system i stops consuming at t˜, then it implies that
rit˜ = θi. 2
E. Proof of Lemma 2
The condition in the statement of the lemma is equivalent to log-supermodularity of
gi(θti |θt−1i ), which requires that for each θ˜ti > θti and θ˜t−1i > θt−1i we must have
gi(θ˜ti |θ˜t−1i )gi(θti |θt−1i )− gi(θ˜ti |θt−1i )gi(θti |θ˜t−1i ) ≥ 0.
where gi(θti |θt−1i ) is given by (6). Therefore, we simply need
h(θti , θ
t−1
i ) =
∫ si
si
f i(θti |si)f i(θt−1i |si)pi(si)dsi
to be log-supermodular to guarantee that gi(θti |θt−1i ) is log-supermodular. A theorem
of Karlin (1968) establishes that, for a measure µ, whenever i(x, s) and j(y, s) are log-
supermodular, then k(x, y) =
∫
S i(x, s)j(y, s)dµ(s) is also log-supermodular. Since, by
Assumption 3, f i(θti |si) is log-supermodular for any t, this completes the proof. 2
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F. Proof of Proposition 4
Given Proposition 1 and Lemma 2 it suffices to show that if x∗i (θj)(G1) is the opti-
mal resource cap when θ1 is distributed according to G1, then for G
′
1 LR G1 we have
x∗1(θ2)(G′1) ≥ x∗1(θ2)(G1) and x∗2(θ1)(G′1) ≤ x∗2(θ1)(G1).
If G′1 LR G1, then the hazard rates satisfy hG′1(θ1) ≤ hG1(θ1) and
1−G′1(θ1)
1−G1(θ1) increases
in θ1. Since (10) implies that
EG′1
[
u′1 (y1 − θ1) | θ1 ≥ y1
]
= −
∫ θ1
y1
u′′1 (y1 − θ1)
1−G1(θ1)
1−G1(y1)dθ1,
it follows from (10) that
EG′1
[
u′1 (y1 − θ1) | θ1 ≥ y1
]
> EG1
[
u′1 (y1 − θ1) | θ1 ≥ y1
]
(19)
From (19) and the definition of y1(θ2) in (11) we have: (i) if y1(θ2)(G1) = 0 then
y1(θ2)(G
′
1) ≥ 0; (ii) if y1(θ2)(G1) = k− θ2 then y1(θ2)(G′1) = k− θ2; and (iii) if y1(θ2)(G1)
satisfies
α1H1(y1(θ2)(G1)) = α0u
′
0 (k − θ2 − y1(θ2)(G1)− θ0) ,
then y1(θ2)(G1) < y1(θ2)(G
′
1). In summary, if G
′
1 LR G1 then y1(θ2)(G′1) ≥ y1(θ2)(G1)
for all θ2 ∈ [θ2, θ2]. Since y2(θ1)(G′1) = y2(θ1)(G1), we can immediately conclude that
(i) k1(G
′
1) > k1(G), k2(G
′
1) < k2(G1) and (ii) x
∗
1(θ2)(G
′
1) ≥ x∗1(θ2)(G1), x∗2(θ1)(G′1) ≤
x∗2(θ1)(G1). 2
G. Proof of Corollary 2
Let It denote the history of needs prior to time t and let Et [·] = E [· | It] be the conditional
expectation given history It. First, the full information optimal allocation rule at any time
t′ is independent of the state si given the needs (θt
′
1 , θ
t′
2 ). Therefore, the law of iterated
expectations implies that for any t′ > t
Et
[
Πt
′
CES
]
= Et
[
E
[
Πt
′
CES | It′
]]
= Et
[
ΠtCES
]
.
This follows as knowing It′ does not change the allocation rule given that the CES will first
observe (θt
′
1 , θ
t′
2 ). Second, improved expected performance under incomplete information
follows from two observations. First, the constraints on dominant strategy incentive com-
patibility do not depend on the common beliefs on the distribution of needs. Thus, every
mechanism that is feasible and DSIC remains so after the CES updates his belief over the
state si. Second, as the set of direct incentive compatible mechanisms remains unchanged
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with the CES’ beliefs, the CES cannot do worse with additional information on si if sys-
tems act myopically. Formally, letting D be the set of feasible and DSIC mechanisms we
have that for t′′ > t′ > t,
Et
[
E
[
Πt
′′
CES | It′′
] ]
= Et
[
max
D
E
[
Πt
′′
CES | It′′
]]
≥ Et
[
E
[
Πt
′′
CES (D
′)| It′′
]]
= Et
[
Πt
′
CES
]
.
where D′ is the optimal mechanism given history It′ . Therefore the expected performance
at t′′ > t′ exceeds the expected performance at t′. 2
H. Proof of Corollary 3
In the text.
I. Proof of Corollary 4
In the text.
J. Proof of Proposition 5
The proof of Proposition 5 is divided into two parts. First, Lemma 6 provides a char-
acterization of the optimal mechanism I under integration of tasks 1 and 2 by system I.
We then proceed to prove Proposition 5. To streamline the exposition in Lemma 6, let
α′0 = (1− γ)α0 and α′i = γαi for i = 1, 2.
Lemma 6 The optimal integration mechanism I is such that CES sets a fixed cap kˆ on
the total resources allocated to system I. The optimal cap kˆ satisfies:
α′1α′2
α′1 + α′2
(
E[θ1 + θ2 | θ1 + θ2 ≥ kˆ]− kˆ
)
= α′0
(
θ0 − [k − kˆ]
)
(20)
Proof. For fixed resources k′ (≥ 0) and needs (θ1, θ2), system I will choose to distribute
them according to
1. If k′ ≥ maxi
{
θi − α
′
j
α′i
θj
}
then
{
x1(k
′; θ1, θ2) = θ1 − α′2(θ1 + θ2 − k′)/(α′1+α′2)
x2(k
′; θ1, θ2) = θ2 − α′1(θ1 + θ2 − k′)/(α′1 + α′2)
,
2. If k′ < θ1 − α
′
2
α′1
θ2 then
{
x1(k
′; θ1, θ2) = k′
x2(k
′; θ1, θ2) = 0
,
3. If k′ < θ2 − α
′
1
α′2
θ1 then
{
x1(k
′; θ1, θ2) = 0
x2(k
′; θ1, θ2) = k′
,
(21)
and the ex-post performance of system I is
ΠI(θ1, θ2, k
′) = − α′1α′2
α′1+α
′
2
(min {k′ − θ1 − θ2, 0})2 if k′ ≥ maxi{θi − α
′
j
α′i
θj},
ΠI(θ1, θ2, k
′) = −α′1 (min {k′ − θ1, 0})2 − α′2θ22 if k′ < θ1 − α
′
2
α′1
θ2,
ΠI(θ1, θ2, k
′) = −α′1θ21 − α′2 (min {k′ − θ2, 0})2 if k′ < θ2 − α
′
1
α′2
θ1.
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The fact that resources allocated to each task must be non-negative accounts for the
allocation rules whenever k′ < maxi
{
θi − α
′
j
α′i
θj
}
. In fact, non-negativity implies that
system I cannot “borrow” negative resources from tasks with lower needs and redirect
them to tasks with higher needs. This insight provides an upper bound on the ex-post
performance of system I given optimal distribution rules (21):
ΠI(θ1, θ2, k
′) ≤ − α
′
1α
′
2
α′1+α′2
(
θ1 + θ2 − k′
)2
. (22)
Clearly, for any k′ and needs (θ1, θ2), expected overall performance is
ΠCES = ΠI(θ1, θ2, k
′)− α′0(min
{(
k − k′ − θ0
)
, 0
}
)2.
To study the optimal mechanism under integration we consider a related optimization
problem (problem P ′) where the performances of CES and system I are given by:
Π′I(θ1, θ2, k
′) = − α
′
1α
′
2
α′1+α′2
(
θ1 + θ2 − k′
)2
, (23)
Π′CES = min
{
−α′0
(
θ0 − (k − k′)
)2
, 0
}
+ Π′I(θ1, θ2, k
′).
We then show that the optimal mechanism for problem P ′ is also the optimal mecha-
nism for our original specification.
(i) Optimal Mechanism for Problem P ′.
The overall performance from the viewpoint of CES in (23) can be written as
Π′CES = −
(
α′1α′2
α′1+α′2
+ α0
)(
k′ − k′CES (θ1, θ2)
)2− α′0α′1α′2
α′1α′2 + α′1α′0 + α′2α′0
(k − θ1 − θ2 − θ0)2 ,
where
k′CES (θ1, θ2) = max
{
α′1α′2
α′1α′2 + α′1α′0 + α′2α′0
(θ1 + θ2)− α
′
0 (α
′
1+α
′
2)
α′1α′2 + α′1α′0 + α′2α′0
(θ0 − k), 0
}
,
is the optimal total amount of resources to system I if the CES knew (θ1, θ2). We first
consider the optimal mechanism of the form k (z) = min{z, kˆ}, and then argue that this
is the optimal mechanism for problem P ′.
(ii) Optimal cap kˆ.
First, with z = θ1 + θ2 we have
G(z) =
∫
Θ1
∫ θ2=z−θ1
θ2
f (θ1, θ2) dθ1dθ2 and g(z) =
∫
Θ1
f1 (θ1) f2 (z − θ1) dθ1
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which follows from independence of θ1 and θ2. The distribution function G(z) is the
convolution of two distributions with an increasing hazard rate, and therefore has also an
increasing hazard rate (Barlow et al 1963). Moreover, the expected performance of CES
with a resource allocation rule kI (z) = min{z, k′} is
JICES
(
k′
)
=
∫ z=k′
0
−α′0 (k − θ0 − z)2 dG(z)
+
∫ z
z=k′
(
−α′0
(
k − θ0 − k′
)2 − α′1α′2
α′1+α′2
(
z − k′)2) dG(z),
where z = θ1 + θ2. The optimal cap kˆ satisfies the first order condition
2
∫ z
z=kˆ
(
α′0
(
k − θ0 − kˆ
)
+
α′1α′2
α′1+α′2
(
z − kˆ
))
dG(z) = 0,
which translates into
α′1α′2
α′1+α′2
(
E
[
z
∣∣∣z ≥ kˆ]− kˆ) = α′0 (θ0 − (k − kˆ)) . (24)
The second order condition is satisfied as z has an increasing hazard rate. Note also
that there would be no gain to CES when solving problem P ′ from banning intermediate
decisions. Indeed suppose that CES offers a mechanism k′(z) of the form
k′(z) =
{
z if z ≤ k1
min{max{z, k2}, kˆ} if z > k1 ,
where resources k′ ∈ (k1, k2) are not available to system I. If system I’s needs are
z ∈ (k1, k2) as his preferences are monotone it would demand at least k2. The CES would
then be better off allowing all resources in (k1, k2), thus reducing the resources allocated
to system I (without changing its performance) and thus improving the performance of
system 0. Therefore ruling out intermediate resources is not optimal.
(iii) Optimal Mechanism under integration.
First we observe that under a mechanism of the form k (z) = min{z, kˆ} the allocation
for each task whenever z ≤ kˆ is the same for a system I with preferences as in (23) or
in our original setup. Moreover, the fact that the solution to problem P ′ is of the form
k′ (z) = min{z, kˆ} implies that it is never optimal to “rule out” intermediate resources in
the original problem. Thus the optimal mechanism in the original problem is of the form
k (z) = min{z, kˆ} with kˆ as in (24).
Proof of Proposition 5: Denote by JICES(γ) the maximum expected performance under
integration and by JMCES(γ) the maximum expected performance under specialization.
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(a) Relative performance of Integration vs. Specialization as γ → 1.
(a-i) Performance under integration.
Given that z = θ¯1 + θ¯2 ≤ k, Lemma 6 establishes that for γ close to 1 the optimal
integration mechanism I sets a cap on resources kˆ where
kˆ =
γ/α0
γ/α0 + (1− γ)( α1α2α1+α2 )
E
[
z
∣∣∣z ≥ kˆ]− (1− γ)( α1α2α1+α2 )
γ/α0 + (1− γ)( α1α2α1+α2 )
(θ0 − k) . (25)
Since θ0 > k it follows that kˆ < z whenever γ < 1 and kˆ → z as γ → 1. To study the
performance of integration as γ → 1 we first determine the rate at which the kˆ increases.
To this end, we make two preliminary observations. First, given the bounded support of
θ1 and θ2, the p.d.f. of g(z) satisfies
g(z) =
∫
Θ1
f1 (θ1) f
2
(
θ¯1 − θ1 + θ¯2
)
dθ1 = 0,
as f2
(
θ¯1 − θ1 + θ¯2
)
= 0 for θ1 < θ¯1. Second,
g′−(z) = −f1
(
θ¯1
)
f2
(
θ¯2
)
< 0.
In order to compute ∂kˆ/∂γ|γ=1− as an application of the implicit function theorem to
(25) we first compute dE
[
z − kˆ
∣∣∣z ≥ kˆ] /dkˆ|γ=1−
dE
[
z − kˆ
∣∣∣ z ≥ kˆ]
dkˆ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
γ=1−
= −1 + lim
γ=1−
g(kˆ)
1−G(kˆ)E
[
z − kˆ
∣∣∣z ≥ kˆ] .
Defining the function N(k) =
∫ z
k (z − k)dG(z) =
∫ z
k (1−G(z))dz , we have
g(k)
1−G(k)E [z − k |z ≥ k ] =
N ′′(k)N(k)
(−N ′(k))2 .
The (leftward) Taylor series expansion of N(k) around z is given by N(k) = g
′(z)
3! (k−z)3 +
O((k − z)4) for k ≤ z. With this expression we readily obtain
lim
γ→1−
g(kˆ)
1−G(kˆ)E
[
z − kˆ
∣∣∣z ≥ kˆ] = lim
γ→1−
N ′′(kˆ)N(kˆ)
(−N ′(kˆ))2 =
g′(z)
3!
g′(z)
1!(
g′(z)
2!
)2 = 23 .
Thus
dE
[
z − kˆ
∣∣∣z ≥ kˆ]
dkˆ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
γ=1−
= −1 + lim
γ=1−
g(kˆ)
1−G(kˆ)E
[
z − kˆ
∣∣∣z ≥ kˆ] = −1
3
,
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and by the implicit function theorem
∂kˆ
∂γ
∣∣∣∣∣
γ=1−
= −α0
( α1α2α1+α2 ) (z + θ0 − k)
dE[z−kˆ|z≥kˆ ]
dkˆ
∣∣∣∣
γ=1−
= 3α0
(
α1α2
α1 + α2
)
(z + θ0 − k) > 0. (26)
(a-ii) Performance under specialization.
To study the case of specialization we will consider the mechanism MD defined by
xMD1 (θ1, θ2) = min{θ1, y1(θ2)},
xMD2 (θ1, θ1) = min{θ2, y2(θ1)},
xMD0 (θ1, θ2) = k − xMD1 (θ1, θ2)− xMD2 (θ1, θ2) ,
where
yi(θj) =
{
k˜i if θj ≤ kˆ − θi
kˆ − θj if θj ≥ kˆ − θi
,
and
k˜i = θ¯i − (1− γ) α0
αi
(
γ + δi2αi
) (θ¯i + θ0 − k) , (27)
where δi is a strictly positive parameter. The mechanism MD always satisfies the resource
constraint (given that θ¯1 + θ¯2 ≤ k) and is dominant strategy incentive compatible. Clearly
MD is not necessarily optimal under specialization, i.e. J
M
CES(γ) ≥ JMDCES(γ). Nevertheless
MD is simpler to analyze than the optimal mechanism under specialization and will suffice
to show that specialization dominates integration as γ → 1.
(a-iii) Comparison integration-specialization.
Define the sets
Ai =
{
(θ1, θ2) : θi ≥ k˜i, θj ≤ kˆ − θi
}
, i ∈ {1, 2} ,
B =
{
(θ1, θ2) : θ1 + θ2 ≥ kˆ
}
.
As the allocation rule under the mechanisms I and MD coincides outside the sets Ai and
B we only need to estimate the difference JMDCES(γ)− JICES(γ) in each of these three sets.
First, for (θ1, θ2) ∈ Ai (i) the mechanism MD restricts the allocation to system i to
k˜i while it grants its needs to system j and (ii) both tasks obtain their needs under the
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mechanism I. We thus have(
JMDCES(γ)− JICES(γ)
)∣∣∣
(θ1,θ2)∈Ai
=
∫
Ai
(
−α0 (1− γ)
(
k − k˜i − θj − θ0
)2 − γαi (k˜i − θi)2 + (1− γ)α0 (k − θi − θj − θ0)2) dF 1dF 2
= 2
∫
Ai
∫ θi
k˜i
(
α0 (1− γ) (s+ θj + θ0 − k)− γαi
(
s− k˜i
))
dsdF 1dF 2
≥ 2
∫
Ai
∫ θi
k˜i
(
α0 (1− γ) (s+ θ0 − k)− γαi
(
s− k˜i
))
dsdF 1dF 2,
which leads to the estimate
2
∫
Ai
∫ θi
k˜i
(
α0 (1− γ) (s+ θ0 − k)− γαi
(
s− k˜i
))
dsdF 1dF 2 ≥ δi
(
θ¯i − k˜i
)
E
[
θi − k˜i|Ai
]
Pr [Ai] ,
where Pr [Ai] = (1− F i(k˜i))F j(kˆ − θi) and the last inequality follows from the definition
of k˜i and that, for 1 > γ >
α0
α0+αi
,
α0 (1− γ) (s+ θ0 − k)−γαi
(
s− k˜i
)
≥ α0 (1− γ)
(
θ¯i + θ0 − k
)−γαi (θ¯i − k˜i) = (θ¯i − k˜i) δi
2
> 0.
Second, for (θ1, θ2) ∈ B both tasks obtain less than their needs both under MD and
I.29 Thus(
JMDCES(γ)− JICES(γ)
)∣∣∣
(θ1,θ2)∈B
= −
∫
B
(∑2
i=1
γαi
(
kˆ − θ1 − θ2
)2 − γ α1α2
α1 + α2
(
θ1 + θ2 − kˆ
)2)
dF 1dF 2
= −γ
(
θ¯1 + θ¯2 − kˆ
)2(
α1 + α1 − α1α1
α1 + α2
)
Pr [B] .
29This can be seen by observing that mechanism MD restricts the resources to both tasks only if
mechanism I restricts total resources to system I. This follows by the observation that k˜1 + k˜2 > kˆ for γ
close to 1. Indeed, since
∂k˜i
∂γ
∣∣∣∣∣
γ=1
=
α0(θ¯i + θ0 − k)
αi
(
1 + δi
2αi
) > 0,
comparing (26) and (27) we have that
∑2
i=1
∂k˜i
∂γ
∣∣∣∣∣
γ=1
=
∑2
i=1
α0(θ¯i + θ0 − k)
αi
(
1 + δi
2αi
) <∑2
i=1
α0(θ¯i + θ0 − k)
αi
<
∑2
i=1
α0(z + θ0 − k)
αi
=
1
3
∂kˆ
∂γ
∣∣∣∣∣
γ=1−
Therefore ∂
∂γ
(∑2
i=1 k˜i − kˆ
)∣∣∣
γ=1
< 0 implying that for γ in a neighborhood of γ = 1, k˜1 + k˜2 > kˆ.
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Using both estimates we obtain the lower bound
JMDCES(γ)− JICES(γ) ≥
(∑2
i=1
(1− F i(k˜i)) + Pr [B]
)(
θ¯1 + θ¯2 − kˆ
)2
(C1(γ)− C2(γ)) ,
(28)
where
C1(γ) =
∑2
i=1 δi
(
θ¯i − k˜i
)
E
[
θi − k˜i|Ai
]
Pr [Ai](∑2
i=1(1− F i(k˜i)) + Pr [B]
)(
θ¯1 + θ¯2 − kˆ
)2 ,
C2(γ) =
(
α1 + α1 − α1α1
α1 + α2
)
γ Pr [B]∑2
i=1(1− F i(k˜i)) + Pr [B]
.
The following limits follow by application of L’Hoˆpital’s rule
lim
γ=1−
θ¯i − k˜i
θ¯1 + θ¯2 − kˆ
=
− dk˜idγ
∣∣∣
γ=1−
− dkˆdγ
∣∣∣
γ=1−
> 0, lim
γ=1−
θ¯i − E [θi|Ai]
θ¯1 + θ¯2 − kˆ
=
− dE[θi|Ai]dγ
∣∣∣
γ=1−
− dkˆdγ
∣∣∣
γ=1−
> 0,
lim
γ=1−
Pr [B]∑2
i=1(1− F i(k˜i)) + Pr [B]
=
g
(
θ¯1 + θ¯2
)
dkˆ
dγ
∣∣∣
γ=1−
−∑2i=1 f i(θ¯i) dk˜idγ ∣∣∣γ=1− − g (θ¯1 + θ¯2) dkˆdγ ∣∣∣γ=1− = 0,
lim
γ=1−
∑2
i=1 Pr [Ai]∑2
i=1(1− F i(k˜i)) + Pr [B]
= 1.
which imply that
lim
γ→1−
C1(γ) > 0 and lim
γ→1−
C2(γ) = 0.
Therefore there exists a neighborhood M of γ = 1 where γ > maxi
[
α0
α0+αi
]
and JMCES(γ) ≥
JMDCES(γ) > J
I
CES(γ) for γ ∈M,γ 6= 1.
(b) Relative performance of Integration vs. Specialization as γ → 0.
Given θ0 > k, when γ = 0 the CES assigns all resources to system 0 both under aggregation
and specialization implying JICES(0) = J
M
CES(0). By the Milgrom-Segal Envelope Theorem
(Milgrom and Segal, 2002) we have
∂JICES(γ)
∂γ
∣∣∣∣
γ=0+
= − α1α2
α1 + α2
E
[
(θ1 + θ2)
2
]
,
∂JMCES(γ)
∂γ
∣∣∣∣
γ=0+
= −α1E
[
θ21
]− α2E [θ22] .
Then
∂
(
JICES(γ)− JMCES(γ)
)
∂γ
∣∣∣∣∣
γ=0+
=
1
α1 + α2
E
[
(α1θ1 − α2θ2)2
]
> 0.
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where the strict inequality follows from independence of θ1 and θ2. Therefore, there exists
a neighborhood N of γ = 0 where JICES(γ) > J
M
CES(γ) for γ ∈ N, γ 6= 0.
K. Proof of Corollary 5
In the text.
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